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ABSTRACT 
 
ROLE OF INVESTOR RELATIONS IN COPING WITH SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM  
 
Lin Ge 
University of Pittsburgh 2018 
  
I study an unexplored role of Investor Relations (IR) firms: assisting public companies to cope 
with shareholder activism. Using hand-collected data on IR firms and their 2,336 publicly listed 
clients during 2003 to 2014 and shareholder activism campaign data for the twelve-year period, 
I find that public companies that hire IR firms experience a significantly lower number of activism 
campaigns, have a higher probability of management winning against the activist, and have a 
higher likelihood of mutual funds voting with the management, compared to a matched sample. 
I also document two plausible channels through which IR firms help incumbent management 
cope with shareholder activism: (i) organizing key face-to-face meetings with institutional 
investors, and (ii) managing media. Such results are robust to controls including proxy advisory 
firms’ recommendations. Lastly, the event study evidence suggests that IR firms enhance 
management entrenchment instead of shareholder value.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of the investor relations (IR) profession can be traced back to 1953 when 
General Electric (GE) founded the first in-house department devoted solely to communicating 
with investors on a regular basis. Since then, many more publicly listed firms have followed suit 
to have IR functions either in-house, or as external consultants, or sometimes both.1 Given the 
existence of hundreds of external IR firms and thousands of IR officers, a natural question to ask 
is what roles do these IR firms play in firms that hire them?2 What is their impact on their client 
firms? More importantly, what are the various channels or mechanisms through which they are 
making those differences, if any?  
The extant empirical literature has given us a head start with Bushee and Miller (2012) 
documenting that smaller companies hire IR to gain visibility and to improve their liquidity. 
Solomon (2012) demonstrates empirically that IR firms can influence media coverage of the firms 
that hire them and increase positive coverage, resulting in higher announcement returns and 
investor expectations. More recently, Karolyi and Liao (2017) provide us with new survey-based 
evidence on IR at a global level and show that IR activities are associated with higher Tobin’s Q 
valuations. Since academics have fairly recently started exploring such questions, the empirical 
research only offers incomplete evidence on the various roles and impacts of IR firms.  
This paper explores and provides empirical evidence of a very different channel through 
which IR firms assist their clients, i.e., in dealing with shareholder activism situations.  
                                                          
1  External IR firms or consultants are also sometimes referred to as IR counselors or IR service providers. 
2 National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), the leading professional organization for investor relations officers,  
reports that it has more than 3,300 members who represent over 1,600 publicly listed companies. 
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Shareholder activism is akin to political contests, where aggressive campaigning to influence 
other shareholders plays a key role. Therefore, IR firms, who specialize in communicating with 
investors, can plausibly play an important role in convincing other shareholders to side with 
management’s agenda. Hence, I ask two main questions: First, do external IR firms help their 
client companies’ management in dealing with shareholder activism? And, second, what are the 
different channels through which IR firms help management to cope with shareholder activism?  
I find that firms with external IR consultants experience a significantly lower number of 
activism campaigns, have a higher probability of management winning against the activist, and 
have a higher likelihood of mutual funds voting with the management. I further document that 
IR consultants assist incumbent management of the client companies in effectively handling 
shareholder activist situations through managing media and organizing key face-to-face meetings 
with institutional investors. More specifically, IR firms help to manage the information flow to 
influence the outcomes of activism campaigns. These results are robust after controlling for proxy 
advisory firms’ recommendations and activists’ use of IR. 
Bushee and Miller (2012) investigate the role of external IR firms in 210 “smaller” and 
“less-visible” firms (defined by their market capitalization), in the seven-year period from 1998 
to 2004, and document that IR firms are effective in helping small and mid-cap firms to attain 
wide visibility and to enhance liquidity of their stocks. However, based on more recent hand-
collected data in the twelve-year period from 2003 to 2014, from O’Dwyer’s PR firms’ annual 
directories, I find that there are many firms that are already very popular and are widely followed 
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by analysts (e.g., big publicly listed firms), but they still use an external IR.3 For example, even the 
very large cap and popular firms like Coca-Cola, Microsoft, General Motors, DuPont and many 
others that do not lack visibility, hire external IR firms. The anecdotal evidence provided in the 
case studies of Trian Fund Management’s engagement with DuPont, and Biglari Capital Corp.’s 
repeated campaigns against Cracker Barrel, discussed in Section VII, demonstrate the critical role 
played by external IRs in coping with shareholder activism. In fact, in my sample that consists of 
2,336 unique publicly listed U.S. firms that have used one or more IR firms during the sample 
period between 2003 and 2014, I find that large-cap firms (market capitalization > $10B) 
increasingly choose to hire external IR.  
In 2014, 49.65% of my sample (firms that had hired an external IR) were large-cap firms, 
compared to the year 2003, when only 27.40% were large-cap firms. Also, there seems to be a 
decreasing trend of hiring outside IRs amongst the small-cap firms (52.24% in 2003 vs. 44.29% in 
2010 vs. 23.78% in 2014). This suggests that enhancing visibility and liquidity are not the only 
benefits of IR functions. I argue that with the advent of internet, social media (Chen, De, Hu and 
Hwang, 2014), fully automated stock exchanges (Jain, 2005) and high frequency trading 
(Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 2014) that have boosted visibility and liquidity of even small 
and mid-cap firms, IR firms are becoming more specialized in providing services that go beyond 
just marketing.  
I find that, although the number of external IR firms have decreased over the years, the 
ones that exist have become more specialized in their services: for example, many IR firms in 
                                                          
3 Solomon (2012) and Gurun (2016) have also used O’Dwyer’s PR firms’ annual directories in their respective studies 
of IR. 
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2014 mention coping with shareholder activism as one of their main services. Such a suspicion 
on the quickly evolving landscape for IR services is further confirmed when I find that over the 
last twelve years it is the mid-cap and large-cap firms that have increasingly hired external IR 
firms. During the same time period, I also observe an increasing trend in shareholder activism, 
especially in targeting larger firms, which seems to closely mirror firms’ growing expenses on 
external IR firms. Denes, Karpoff and McWilliams (2017) also report in their survey on thirty years 
of empirical research on shareholder activism that, “Although the number of (shareholder) 
proposals has been roughly steady in recent years, activists have increased the rate at which they 
target large firms.”  Such patterns suggest the possibility that the two trends, i.e., the increase in 
the rate of activism in large firms, and an upsurge in large-cap firms hiring external IR, are linked.  
I find that firms that hire external IR are less likely to be targeted by activists within the 
next five years, compared to a matched sample based on certain firm characteristics that are 
associated with the probability of a firm hiring external IR. And, among the firms that are targeted 
by activists, those that have hired an external IR experience 0.13 fewer campaigns than those 
firms that have not hired external IR, controlling for other important independent variables. I also 
find that having an external IR on firm’s side increases the probability of a management win in 
cases in which the activist is a non-prolific activist. Moreover, I document that the presence of an 
external IR consultant on the firm’s side is associated with higher likelihood of mutual funds 
voting with the management on proposals. This is a key result, as large institutional owners like 
the mutual funds, listen to both parties, i.e., the activist and management, and their voting boils 
down to whose corporate strategic plan or direction they like more (Brav, Jiang and Li, 2018). 
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Such results indicate that having an external IR on management’s side helps to garner support 
from other large institutional owners, which is crucial in winning such contested situations. 
Furthermore, I identify two distinct plausible channels through which IR is making a 
difference. The first channel is through organizing key face-to-face meetings such as 
investor/analyst days and broker-hosted investor conferences with institutional investors. It is a 
preemptive measure whereby IR firms and their activities shape the viewpoints of existing 
shareholders, and possibly also influence the composition of ownership even before an activist 
arrives or an activism situation escalates to have management friendly institutional investors 
(Brav, Jiang and Li, 2018). IR firms constantly monitor a firm’s shareholder base and watch out 
for sudden changes in institutional ownership. A survey study conducted by NIRI (2013) finds that 
81% of IR professionals deem shareholder identification as very or extremely important to their 
IR function and 91% use SEC filings such as 13F, 13G, and 13D to identify current institutional 
shareholders.4 I hypothesize that such monitoring of shareholder base by IR firms is not only 
done as a proactive measure to identify and pacify any potential activist shareholder by engaging 
them in a non-confrontational dialogue before such situations transform into battles played out 
in public, but also plausibly done to identify, reach out and attract current and other potential 
key long-term and passive institutional shareholders. Such preemptive measures help in 
influencing other passive institutional investors, who play a key role in activism contests due to 
their voting power in proxy fights and increase the likelihood that other big institutional owners 
would be on the side of the incumbent management, should a proxy fight situation arise.  
                                                          
4 Some firms also actively monitor daily trading of their stocks through specialized stock watch surveillance services: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115551994704734777. 
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I find that the presence of an IR firm is negatively associated with the firm’s institutional 
ownership, measured as a percentage of total shares outstanding. It seems that this negative 
association is due to the lower active institutional ownership as passive institutional ownership 
level is not significantly different from the firms in the same year and industry and propensity 
score-matched on market value, market-to-book, and ROA. However, I find that firms that hire 
an external IR have nearly 30 more institutional owners than their matched firms that do not 
have an IR, after controlling for other factors. One potential concern with such results is reverse 
causality. It is possible that it is the composition of institutional ownership that creates the 
demand for an external IR firm. I address such concerns to an extent by corroborating the results 
using a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression framework with balanced treatment and 
control groups and by also incorporating other observable control variables.  
Furthermore, I document that a plausible second channel through which IR firms assist 
the incumbent management cope with shareholder activism is through managing media. Media 
can play a crucial role in such political contests with an activist in influencing other shareholders 
to side with the incumbent management (Aggarwal, Erel and Starks, 2018). Using Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2011) positive and negative word lists and textual analysis of the news generated, I 
find that companies with an external IR consultant not only have significantly greater firm-
originated media coverage, but also generate significantly less negative sentiments via news in 
media. All the results above are significant at either 1% or 5% levels when compared to a matched 
sample.  
Finally, using event study methodologies, I find that the market reacts negatively to the 
use of external IR consultants in the context of shareholder activism. Such results are consistent 
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with the hypothesis that IR firms entrench management at the expense of shareholder value. 
Overall, I furnish evidence on an important yet unexplored and evolving role of Investor Relations 
(IR) in managing shareholder activism and put forth two plausible channels, i.e., (i) organizing key 
face-to-face meetings with institutional investors, and (ii) managing media that are enabling it. 
However, the research designs implemented in the paper are still susceptible to endogeneity 
issues such as sample selection bias, simultaneity, and omitted variables. Even though I have used 
matching on observables and different fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics, 
in the absence of a clear source of exogenous variation on the treatment, i.e., the presence of an 
IR, the results shown here are at best predictive and not necessarily causal.  With this caveat in 
mind, the rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II is the literature review on shareholder 
activism and investor relations, Section III discusses the theoretical motivation I use to develop 
the hypotheses, section IV introduces the data and presents the summary statistics, section V 
discusses the empirical methodology and the main results, section VI presents additional 
robustness tests, section VII describes two detailed cases studies, and finally section VIII 
concludes.  
 
  
8 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon in the U.S. It is an external corporate 
governance mechanism that has existed since the early 1900s (Gillan and Starks, 2007). It rose to 
prominence during the rise of corporate raiders in the 1980s and has now become an important, 
if not the most critical mechanism for corporate influence. Since the seminal work of Berle and 
Means (1932) that emphasized the agency problems that arise from separated ownership and 
control, and is exacerbated in diffusely owned firms, the role played by large shareholders in 
corporate governance is not difficult to comprehend. In essence, shareholder activists are 
disgruntled large shareholders who can be very useful either through their direct intervention 
(i.e., “voice”) or their threat of exit (i.e., “voting with one’s feet”) to solve agency problems.  
Rise in activism in the last few decades can be attributed to both the demand side and 
the supply side of shareholder activism. While on the demand side, disciplining of managers 
through the “market for corporate control” (Manne, 1965) was becoming ineffective due to the 
different firm anti-takeover defenses and hence there was a demand for an alternative, i.e., the 
“market for corporate influence” (Cheffins and Armour, 2011) through shareholder intervention 
and activism. On the supply side, the crises such as the hi-tech bubble bust in the early 2000s and 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008, created an opportunity post-crises for shareholder activists to 
target companies that were trading below their fair values. 
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1.1 Causes of Shareholder Activism 
Theory predicts that the primary cause of shareholder activism is governance deficit in 
the target firms (Edmans, 2014). When a firm’s manager’s goals are misaligned with the 
shareholders’ interests to maximize value, it gets reflected in its undervaluation. Empirical 
researchers have documented that Tobin’s q {i.e., (book value of debt + market value of 
equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity)}, which is a proxy for firm valuation, is 
inversely associated with the likelihood of shareholder activism, showing that shareholder 
activists tend to target firms that are inefficiently managed and are hence, undervalued (Brav, 
Jiang, and Kim, 2015). Furthermore, researchers have found in multivariate regressions that the 
market value of equity is inversely related to the probability of activist interventions both in the 
U.S. and elsewhere (Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2015; Mietzner and 
Schweizer, 2014). Weak corporate governance can also manifest through poor profitability. 
Corroborating this vein of thought, empirical studies have documented that profitability, as 
proxied by a firm’s return on assets (i.e., ROA), is also negatively related with being a shareholder 
activist’s target (Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2015; Denes, Karpoff, and McWilliams, 2017). 
Other big triggers of shareholder intervention seem to be value-reducing suboptimal 
financial policies. Shareholder activists tend to target firms that not only have significantly higher 
leverage than similar firms but also have lower dividend payouts (Brav, Jiang and Kim, 2015). This 
is because suboptimal financial policy is another plausible symptom of governance deficit at a 
firm. More direct evidence of targeted firms having poor governance is the presence of weaker 
shareholder rights as measured with governance indices such as GINDEX (Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, 2003) and EINDEX (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009). Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009) 
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document a significant positive association between the likelihood of getting targeted by an 
activist and the number of takeover defenses as given by GINDEX. 
Finally, an important assumption underlying my research hypotheses is that shareholder 
activists rely on the support from other large, sophisticated institutional shareholders to make 
any changes either in the management or the direction in the strategy of the targeted firms. It is 
because shareholder activists are usually minority stakeholders with average ownerships ranging 
from 5% to 10%. A robust empirical finding supporting this assumption from the current 
literature is the significant positive relation between institutional ownership and activist 
intervention (Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2015). More recently, Brav, Jiang, and Li (2018) have 
documented that a pro-activist shareholder base comprised of relatively more active financial 
institutions or funds as compared to passive financial institutions or funds, is an attractive 
characteristic of target firms. The following section discusses the various mechanisms used by 
shareholder activists as identified in the literature. 
 
1.2 Mechanisms Used by Shareholder Activists: “Exit” and “Voice” 
 It was economist Albert Otto Hirschman who famously coined the terms “exit” and 
“voice” in 1970 in his book titled, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” with respect to the responses 
consumers can have if they are unhappy with the quality of goods sold to them. While “exit” 
referred to withdrawing from the existing relationship with the firm, “voice” referred to an 
attempt to improve the ongoing relationship via communications and dialogue. Hirschman’s 
(1970) idea can be easily translated into the case of shareholder activism. Disgruntled 
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shareholders, just like unhappy consumers, broadly have two strategic choices to cope with 
target firms’ management.  
The first is the threat of exit, also known as “voting with one’s feet.” The idea here is that 
if a shareholder activist is dissatisfied with the current management and its strategies, she can 
sell her shares in the market, creating a downward pressure on the firm’s stock price. This would 
be ex-post costly for the manager, whose compensation is often tied to a firm’s stock 
performance. A rational manager who is aware of a possibility of such an ex-post penalty would 
be incentivized to maximize shareholders’ value ex-ante. Hence, the theoretical literature 
predicts that governance through the threat of “exit” can prove to be an effective tool for 
shareholder activists (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009). Moreover, in a survey-based 
study of institutional investors, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) document that 42% of 
institutional investors who responded believed in the effectiveness of threat of “exit.” 
The second mechanism used by shareholder activists is “voice.” “Voice” refers to the 
different modes of direct interventions such as private and public communications with the 
incumbent management, proposals suggesting a specific strategic or operational action to the 
management, other shareholder proposals, nomination of board members at annual shareholder 
meetings, proxy contests, legal actions against the management, and others. However, “voice” 
is prone to free-rider problems, where the activist eventually only gets to share a fraction of the 
benefits of intervention, proportional to her ownership, while she bears the entire cost of 
activism. This could disincentivize a shareholder activist from taking any actions. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) offer an intuitive solution to this problem and theorize that if a shareholder holds 
a large enough proportion of the firm, she would be incentivized to monitor and intervene, and 
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the other shareholders will be more likely to support her, knowing that her incentives are aligned 
with shareholder value maximization.  
Following Shleifer and Vishny (1986), there are several other theoretical models on 
shareholders’ intervention through “voice” (e.g., Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Kahn and 
Winton, 1998; Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole, 2004; Brav and Mathews, 2011, etc.). Most recently, 
Edmans, Levit, and Reilly (2017) unify ideas from both “exit” and “voice” models for shareholders 
holding significant stakes in multiple firms. They highlight that both these mechanisms can play 
roles concurrently and are more effective in a multi-firm ownership set-up. Moreover, McCahery, 
Sautner, and Starks (2016) find in their survey study that most of their respondents believed 
“exit” and “voice” strategies were complements rather than substitutes and intervention through 
“voice” was often orchestrated behind the scenes. This leads to the next subsection on private 
communications.  
 
1.2.1 Private Communications 
 A significant portion of interactions between shareholder activists and management is 
unobservable to an empiricist as it takes place privately. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) 
analyzed private correspondences between TIAA-CREF, a large pension fund and forty-five of its 
targeted companies during the time-period 1992 and 1996. The authors found in their sample 
that TIAA-CREF was able to reach an agreement with its target firms 95% of the time. However, 
strikingly more than 70% of these cases were merely due to private communications, sans any 
shareholder voting contest.  
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In another similar but UK based clinical study of Hermes, a British Telecom Pension fund, 
over the period 1998-2004, Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009), found that shareholder 
activism primarily occurred through private communications. In a finding which is more directly 
related to my thesis, the authors also found that in addition to the usual governance objectives 
related to restructuring, board changes, and financial policies, Hermes also demanded better 
investor relations from its target firms and often had private meetings with the heads of their 
investor relations.  
In their survey study, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), explicitly asked institutional 
investors about private interactions at occasions such as investor relations events with their 
target firms. 63% of respondents reported that they engaged in private communications with 
management. However, despite the importance of private communications in shareholder 
interventions, they are unobservable most of the time to the empiricists, and hence researchers 
have relied mainly on public communications which are discussed in the following section.           
 
1.2.2 Public Communications 
 When private and behind-the-scenes activism is unsuccessful, shareholder activist’s 
intervention can take various forms that are observable publicly. For example, activists can switch 
from Schedule 13G to 13D filings and express their intent of intervention in a public SEC filing.   
Activists can also berate the incumbent management and criticize the status quo of the firm at 
an annual meeting or in the media. McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) found that 13% of the 
respondents (institutional investors) in their study reported that they took the measure of 
publicly criticizing management in the media. Shareholder activists can also take legal actions 
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against the management. Submitting shareholder proposals for the proxy statements and the 
eventual proxy contests are also public measures taken by activists.  
Communications via public channel can be a handy tool for both management and the 
dissident to persuade other shareholders to vote for their position. It can also serve as an 
effective mechanism for management to respond to criticisms of the firm’s plans and directors 
laid by the disgruntled activist. The role of public communications is even more critical in an 
activism situation vis-à-vis a takeover battle since in an acquisition there is a formal consideration 
of cash or stock offered. Whereas in the case of activism situations, it is a battle of opinions, and 
the side that is successfully able to persuade other shareholders to vote for their position, wins. 
In a recent working paper by Brav, Jiang and Li (2018), the authors model investor 
“persuadability” and document a positive correlation between the likelihood of targeting by an 
activist and the presence of pro-activist and easy to persuade shareholders. Unlike behind-the-
scenes activism, such public communications are observable to a researcher, and can be 
extremely useful in studying shareholder activism. The next section describes consequences of 
shareholder activism found in the extant literature. 
 
1.3 Consequences of Shareholder Activism 
 The impact of shareholder activism has always been a controversial topic. In his survey 
paper on shareholder activism in the U.S., Black (1998) noted, “… the best reading of the currently 
available evidence is that institutional investor activism doesn’t importantly affect firm 
performance.” Years later, Gillan and Starks (2007) conveyed similar sentiments in another 
review, and concluded, “We review the evidence on activism and, while some studies have found 
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positive short-term market reactions to announcements of certain kinds of activism, there is little 
evidence of improvement in the long-term operating or stock-market performance of the targeted 
companies.” The intuition behind such views is that shareholder activists are usually short-term 
investors and hence are not beneficial for the long-term performance of the targets. 
 However, more recently, Brav, Jiang and Kim (2015) conducted a comprehensive review 
of a special type of shareholder activists, i.e., hedge funds activists, and found that hedge fund 
activists create both short-term and long-term value for their target firms. They documented that 
during the years from 1994 to 2011, the average cumulative abnormal return for the [-20,+20] 
days window around the activism announcement in the U.S. was about 5%. Other researchers 
such as Clifford (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Boyson and 
Mooradian (2011) reported similar positive abnormal returns, indicating that the market 
perceives hedge fund activism as value enhancing. Nonetheless, questions can still be raised 
about the real long-term effects of hedge fund activism. 
 Greenwood and Schor (2009) estimated long-term abnormal returns and found that the 
average long-term cumulative abnormal returns for the [-1,+18] month window is over 10%. 
Moreover, most of this return accrued during the [+3,+18] month window, that is, post-
intervention. Clifford (2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009) found qualitatively similar buy-and-
hold long-term results in their respective samples using Fama-French four-factor models. Studies 
have also documented significant improvements in terms of operating performance post-
intervention. For example, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) found significant improvements in 
both ROA and Tobin’s Q that last at least five years post activist intervention. Furthermore, Brav, 
Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2018) documented improvements in corporate innovation during the five 
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years post activism. Such results challenge the short-termism criticism of hedge fund activists. 
However, such debate is far from being settled as Coffee and Palia (2016) conclude in their 
comprehensive monograph on hedge fund activism, “… engagements by activist hedge funds 
appear to be producing a significant externality: severe cut-backs in long-term investment…by 
both the targeted firms and other firms not targeted but still deterred from making such 
investments.” 
 In sum, although certain types of shareholder activists (e.g., prominent hedge fund 
activists) seem to be more effective in value creation through interventions in general, the focus 
on short-term goals by some institutional activists can also create a mismatch with the goals of 
long-term shareholders. Despite the extensive research on shareholder activism in the last thirty 
years that has improved our understanding of the modus operandi and impact of shareholder 
activists, the extant literature has largely neglected the role played by investor relations in 
general and external investor consultants in particular in influencing activism decisions and its 
impact. Hence, the next section discusses the role of investor relations firms in shareholder 
activism. 
 
2. Role of Investor Relations Firms in Shareholder Activism 
Investor Relations (IR) firms are external consultants hired by firms’ management who 
provide investor-focused advice. Their main expertise is in communicating with investors on 
behalf of the management. Using a sample of 210 small- and mid-cap companies during the years 
1998 to 2004, Bushee and Miller (2012) documented that hiring an outside IR firm improved 
firm’s liquidity and visibility. Solomon (2012) showed that IR firms can influence media coverage 
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about a firm and eventually its stock return. Karolyi and Liao (2017) conducted a global survey of 
IR officers from 59 countries and found that IR functions are positively associated with increase 
in firm value as proxied by Tobin’s Q. 
Other than the functions documented in the literature, IR firms claim that they target pro-
management investors, continuously monitor the shareholder base for their client companies, 
and assist them with diffusing and tackling shareholder activism situations. For example, IR firm 
Georgeson mentions on its website, “We can help you get to know your shareholders. Determine 
exactly who holds corporate bonds or equities. Determine the structure of your underlying 
shareholder base. Reveal patterns of ownership migration. Track ownership by both long and 
short term (hedge fund) investors.”  During the 2013 NIRI Senior Roundtable Conference, the IR 
participants recommended, “Identifying those (investors) with investment styles based on good 
intentions (long-term and management friendly) and classifying them separately from dissident 
investors.”  
The IR firms do so by organizing meetings between management and institutional 
shareholders, communicating with shareholders, and managing press releases and media. 
Maintaining the IR section of the company’s website and managing crisis communications are 
some other services provided by IR firms. Overall, both the academic and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that IR firms are corporate communications specialists, who serve as the main conduit 
between management and shareholders/analysts. A global investor relations officers survey 
conducted in 2012 by IR Magazine found that most IR consultants either have a background in 
finance or corporate communications and law, which provides some evidence on their expertise. 
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However, despite the anecdotal evidence on the role of IR firms in shareholder activism, there is 
no empirical evidence in the extant literature.       
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III. THEORETICAL MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES 
 
1. The Impact 
Theory on the role and effect of IR is broadly split into two paradigms: One, in which IR 
does not matter and the other, in which IR can potentially play important roles. The first and the 
more dominant view has been that markets are reasonably efficient and prices correctly reflect 
all available information (Fama, 1970). Hence, there is nothing an IR officer or consultant could 
do to enhance the value of a firm as it would not change the fundamentals of the firm. But one 
might wonder why IR officers are then able to earn such high salaries in a competitive market if 
they are not providing any added value.5  
This leads to the second theoretical view proposed by Merton (1987) who argues that in 
a model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information, “stock price sometimes 
reacts to a broad and widely-circulated report about the firm, even when all the substantive 
information in the report has been previously announced.” He investigated how a firm decides 
the size of its investor base using this “rational” model with incomplete information, which shows 
that an increase in the relative size of the firm's investor base will reduce the firm's cost of capital 
and hence increase the market value of the firm. More importantly, even when there is no new 
information released to the public, “a new form of public release of the information” can capture 
attention of investors who do not follow the stock, which in turn will increase the firm’s investor 
base and stock price. Merton’s model of investor recognition provides a raison d’etre for IR firms 
                                                          
5 NIRI Member Database (October, 2015) reports that 29% of their members make greater than $215k per annum, 
30% earn between 175k-214k per annum and 41% make up to $174k per annum. Karolyi and Liao (2017) also 
document that firms on an average pay IR officers a base salary of 125k-175k plus bonus incentives. 
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and a rationale especially for smaller and relatively unknown firms willing to expend their 
resources on investor relations as empirically substantiated by Bushee and Miller (2012).     
Another, somewhat related theoretical line of thinking is based on the divergence of 
opinions amongst investors. Here the underlying assumption is that in an uncertain world, all 
investors cannot be assumed to have homogeneous expectations. It is likely that their opinions 
and forecasts about a firm could vary even when they are acting rationally.6  Miller (1977) argued 
that the greater the divergence of opinion amongst investors on a particular firm, the riskier are 
its stocks. He suggested that publicity (both good and bad) could potentially attenuate such 
divergence. It can be argued that a diminishing divergence of opinions could potentially benefit 
both small and large firms and IR firms can play an important role in it. More recently, Banerjee 
and Kremer (2010) used a dynamic model to demonstrate how investors can have differences in 
opinions on the interpretation of the same public information. Solomon (2012) argued that 
managers can also try to exert influence over investor opinion through news coverage.  
Shareholder activism is a contest of opinions, where both the activist and the firm’s 
management are trying to influence each other and the other shareholders with their respective 
opinions about the future strategic directions a firm ought to take. In such a setting, if one 
believes that IR functions can not only diminish such divergence in opinions but also influence 
investor opinion in a particular direction, then, it follows that IR firms can help in coping with 
shareholder activism. IR firms also advertise that they provide services that help their client firms 
succeed in activist situations. For example, one of the IR firms in my sample, CamberView 
                                                          
6 In 2013, two high profile activist hedge fund managers, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square Capital and Dan Loeb of 
Third Point publicly proclaimed diametrically opposite views on the future of Herbalife International, a U.S. 
multinational company listed on the NYSE and also traded based on their respective beliefs.  
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Partners states on their website, “Our services are distinct from those provided by investment 
banks, law firms, proxy solicitors, and public relations specialists because our team’s background 
is unique. We develop the playbook companies use to succeed in contested situations. We 
provide…strategies to win key votes on impending or active ballot situations.” 7 Another IR firm 
in my sample, Edelman, claims “Activist attacks and contested shareholder votes challenge 
corporate governance, leadership structure and long-term business strategy. Once an activist 
investor threatens a fight or highlights a corporate governance weakness, directors and 
management will find themselves fighting a barrage of negative attention and publicity. Edelman 
works with its clients to mobilize a strategic communications campaign to defend against and 
overcome the activist’s threats.” 8 
If IR firms are indeed effective in assisting the client firm’s management to deal with 
activism campaigns, I expect that when an incumbent management foresees its firm being the 
potential target of activism campaigns in the future, it hires an external IR consulting firm. And 
after hiring an external IR consulting firm, the probability of firms being targeted by activism 
should be lower as compared to their matched firms, that are similar in observable characteristics 
but do not hire IR. To this end, I develop the following hypothesis: 
H1A. Ceteris paribus, there will be an ex-post negative association between the probability 
of being a target of shareholder activism campaign and the use of an external IR by a firm’s 
management.  
                                                          
7 http://www.camberview.com/our-services/ 
8 http://www.edelman.com/expertise/edelman-financial-communications-special-situations/shareholder-activism/ 
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However, hiring an external IR consultant does not guarantee that a firm will not be 
targeted. In cases in which firms are still targeted by activism post-hiring external IR consultant, 
I expect that the role of external IR should be reflected in the reduction in number of campaigns. 
This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H1B. All else equal, there will be an ex-post negative association between the number of 
activism campaigns and the use of an external IR by a firm’s management. 
Also, if IR firms are able to impact the outcomes of activism campaigns in favor of the 
incumbent management, we should expect to observe a positive association between firms with 
external IR and their campaign outcomes as management win. Hence, my third hypothesis is: 
H1C. All else equal, there will be a positive association between the probability of a 
management win and the use of an external IR by a firm. 
Finally, in this battle of opinions, in which each side is attempting to win other 
shareholders over on their side, if external IRs are of any help to the management in winning 
over other big shareholders in activist situations, it should be reflected ex-post in actual voting 
behavior of other major shareholders like that of the mutual funds. From this perspective, I 
hypothesize:  
H1D. All else equal, there will be a positive association between the presence of an 
external IR consultant on management’s side and support of the other institutional shareholders 
for the management during proxy voting. 
So far, the above four hypotheses are focused on answering the question whether 
external IR firms help their client companies’ management to cope with shareholder activism. In 
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the next section, I explore the plausible channels via which the IR firms could be making those 
differences. 
 
2. The Channels 
In order to organize the empirical work to assess the different potential channels through 
which IR is plausibly impacting the likelihood and outcomes of shareholder activism as 
hypothesized above, I begin with some simple stylized models and use these models to make 
certain testable empirical predictions. As demonstrated in Figure 1, activism campaigns can be 
classified into two stages, namely, private negotiations and public negotiations. In both these 
stages, IR arguably plays a key role, being the main conduit between the target’s management 
and the major institutional investors, including the activist. Moreover, as anecdotal and survey 
evidence suggests, IR also helps firms take preemptive measures even prior to the advent of an 
activist by constantly monitoring and reaching out to the current shareholder base and by being 
cognizant of any sudden changes in the firm’s shareholder base. Therefore, I analyze the possible 
channels via which IR helps firms cope with shareholder activism. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
2.1 Active Interactions with Institutional Investors  
One key channel through which IR consultants can help a firm deal with potential activism 
is the preemptive channel. In other words, IR consultants can help to facilitate active and face-
to-face interactions between management and investors on a regular basis, especially with large 
institutional investors. Such interactions can keep investors updated about the progress and 
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agenda of the firm, and provide opportunities for investors to express any views and concerns 
they might have about the firm.  Therefore, I hypothesize that:     
H2. All else equal, there will be a positive association between various forms of 
interactions between the management and the investors, and the use of an external IR by a firm.  
From the management’s perspective, another potential advantage of active interactions 
with major shareholders is monitoring the ownership. Based on the extant corporate governance 
literature, we know that large shareholders or institutional owners can intervene in distinct ways 
ranging from more active “voice” and “exit” strategies to more passive informal negotiations, 
often known as “jawboning.” Let us assume that the value created by institutional owner’s active 
interposition in such as proxy fights is G. If the institutional owner’s initial fractional ownership is 
α, then, the value gained by the institutional owner will be αG. But activism is costly and is prone 
to free-rider problems. It can be reasoned that it is economically feasible for the institutional 
owner to actively intervene only when the cost of active intervention CA < αG, where the higher 
is the initial stake α of the blockholder, the greater is the return of active intervention.  
Therefore, based on the above theoretical setup, it can be argued that the higher the 
initial fractional ownership α of the institutional owner, the greater the chances that the 
institutional owner would take the path of an active intervention. On the other hand, if α is small, 
the institutional owner would likely choose more passive informal negotiations and avoid a more 
direct costly conflict. Theoretically, there exists a minimum level of ownership, αA, below which 
it would be prohibitively costly for an institutional owner to initiate active intervention.   
Such a stylized model would predict that firms and their incumbent management would 
ideally like institutional shareholders, especially the active ones, to have a shareholding below αA 
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at all times to minimize the probability of active interventions. However, it does not necessarily 
imply that managers are always opposed to value-increasing suggestions from the activist. They 
are opposed if it threatens their job or entrenchment. If one believes that external IR firms are 
playing a key role in helping management cope with activism as they constantly keep a watch on 
the shareholder base, it can be argued that IR firms possibly help in keeping the shareholdings of 
institutional investors below the threshold level of αA.9 This leads to the principal prediction of 
this model, which is: 
H3A. All else equal, there will be a negative association between average individual 
institutional ownership and the use of an external IR by a firm. 
Such negative relation is also attainable if the incumbent management only hires an 
external IR when institutional ownership is low and the benefits of hiring an IR are greater than 
its costs.  However, it is also possible that firms with high institutional ownership would need to 
hire an external IR to manage their relationship with institutional owners. This line of thinking 
would lead to a positive association between average individual institutional ownership and the 
use of an external IR by a firm, and therefore an alternative hypothesis could be:  
H3B. All else equal, there will be a positive association between average individual 
institutional ownership and the use of an external IR by a firm. 
The direction of this relation is not obvious, and therefore, it is ultimately an empirical 
question.  
                                                          
9 The above governance model can also be extended to passive interventions. If an institutional owner decides to go 
the route of passive intervention like “jawboning,” the potential total value creation would not be G, but lesser and 
let us say it is (1-β) G, where β>0. Hence, on a successful passive intervention, the gain to the institutional owner will 
be α (1-β) G and if we assume the cost of passive intervention is CP, it will naturally be a lot less than CA. This would 
not alter the principal prediction of the model. 
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Most activism campaigns start with private communications or meetings, unobservable 
to the empiricist, between the activist and the target firm.10 Such conversations can begin with 
either a simple telephone call, an e-mail or a one-to-one meeting. Such private communications 
could also be held with other major institutional shareholders such as mutual funds, pension 
funds, endowment funds, indexed funds etc., who may not be activists themselves but could 
eventually play a key role in the case of a proxy fight, as both the activist and the incumbent 
management would want them to be on their respective sides at the time of voting. Unlike 
acquisitions, where the key to completing a deal is often the level of ownership and control, and 
the price offered (cash or stock or both), the secret in the case of shareholder activism campaigns 
is the ability to persuade the counterparty and the other large shareholders, as in this case the 
value effects need to be estimated (Aggarwal, Erel and Starks, 2018; Brav, Jiang and Li, 2018).  
Both theoretical and empirical extant literature has indicated that most activist 
institutional shareholders, many of whom are hedge funds, are less risk-averse and more return-
driven than other passive institutional investors such as pension funds or indexed funds. For 
example, activist hedge funds are undiversified as they take large positions in just a handful of 
companies, and they often use short positions, high leverage and derivative instruments in their 
investment strategies. Such funds are also not subject to disclosure standards of other 
institutional investors such as the pension funds and mutual funds. Activist fund managers are 
often compensated through nonlinear incentive payments, which also makes them more risk-
                                                          
10 Recently, Solomon and Soltes (2015) and Bushee, Gerakos and Lee (2016) have found some empirical evidence on 
the importance of such private meetings with institutional owners, using proprietary data and data on flights 
undertaken by firms, respectively. The main thrust of both their findings is that private meetings and conversations 
enable the institutional owners to make better and more informed decisions. 
27 
 
seeking and return-focused. By contrast, passive institutional investors, such as the pension 
funds, mutual funds, endowment funds, etc., have a stricter regulatory oversight and 
transparency requirements, greater restrictions on investing styles, and are required to be well-
diversified. Such requirements make them more risk-sensitive and longer-term focused. Hence, 
both these groups have their own perceived risk-return trade-offs and are more focused on 
either return (more return-driven) or risk (more risk-sensitive) depending on their degree of risk 
aversion.  
If we believe that IR can choose to emphasize certain risk-return characteristics based on 
the type of institutional investors, then we can argue that IR might be able to influence the 
composition of a firm’s ownership structure indirectly through persuasion (Mullainathan and 
Shleifer (2005a) and Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2008)). On the one hand, in order 
to mitigate the potential threat of activism (which is often initiated by active shareholders such 
as hedge funds), IR is likely to take an approach to persuade shareholder activists to walk away 
from their campaign by convincing them that the potential return from the costly campaign might 
not be as high as they expect, which might lead to the reduction of the active institutional 
ownership because activists will reallocate their limited capital to targets with potentially higher 
returns. On the other hand, IR will focus their message on low risk (with the guarantee of the 
minimum threshold required return) while communicating with other large institutional owners 
to maintain the passive institutional ownership.  
Therefore, my following hypotheses are: 
H4A. All else equal, there will be a negative association between active institutional 
ownership and the use of an external IR by a firm.  
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H4B. All else equal, there will be a non-negative association between passive institutional 
ownership and the use of an external IR by a firm. 
A plausible, but not necessarily contradicting, alternative reasoning for the above 
hypotheses could be that since the presence of IR consultants lowers the probability of successful 
activism, the instance of active institutions to own shares is lower. 
 
2.2 Managing Media 
The final stage of activism when the parties are unable to reach any agreement in the 
private negotiations stage is a public fight or a proxy contest. Since, such political contests 
between the incumbent management and the activist institutional shareholder can be seen as a 
market for gathering influence in support for their respective agendas, media can potentially play 
a crucial role. Survey evidence suggests that IR aggressively uses media to generate sentiments 
in favor of their client firm and its incumbent management. The extant literature has also found 
media to be effective in impacting investor sentiments (Tetlock, 2007; Fang and Peress, 2009; 
Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Dai, Parwada and Zhang, 2015). IR firms 
also claim on their websites that one of the key services they provide is communicating their 
clients’ stories more vigorously to highlight the companies’ or the management’s point of view. 
Both Bushee and Miller (2012) and Solomon (2012) also find that media coverage is increased in 
the presence of an IR firm in their respective samples.  Therefore, to understand the role of media 
in the context of activism campaigns and how IR can use it, I follow a very basic and stylized model 
similar to Engelberg and Parsons (2011).  
29 
 
Let us say that a particular publicly listed firm’s stock demand function is given by D (F, IR 
(F, Y)). Note that sufficient demand for the firm’s stock in the market indicates support for the 
strategies of the current management. Here, D is a function of F and IR where F refers to the firm 
and market fundamentals which are publicly available and are known to all and IR is the coverage 
provided by IR firms through media. IR, in turn, is a function of F, the fundamentals, and Y, which 
is a vector of characteristics that only influence the IR coverage and has nothing to do with the 
change in fundamentals. Taking the derivative of such a demand function with respect to F (i.e., 
the fundamentals) we get, 
𝐷𝐷 =  𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕 + 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕 +  𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑑𝑑𝜕𝜕 
In the above equation, the first term on the right-hand side refers to how investors’ 
demand fluctuates with the underlying changes in the firm’s or market’s fundamentals and is 
independent of the services provided by IR. Hence, in an efficient capital markets world in which 
IR has no causal impact, the next two terms should be zero. On the contrary, if we believe that IR 
has an important role to play, then, the second term captures the key process by which IR 
coverage through media can shape investors’ perceptions and hence the stock’s demand. In 
other words, this term shows that even if we believe that IR is not adding any new information 
and reducing information asymmetry, the way it helps investors to process and understand the 
information plays a key role. In other words, this is consistent with Merton’s (1987) argument on 
the importance of the form of release of the information. The last term captures the IR firm’s 
influence which is not related to changes in fundamentals of the firm or the market. It can be 
treated as IR using media to “slant” (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005b) stories or “spin” 
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(Solomon, 2012) news in the incumbent management’s favor using different tones to generate 
sentiments.  
If we believe that media coverage, especially negative/positive news, can generate 
negative/positive sentiments and support for the incumbent management and IR uses it as a tool, 
then, one can hypothesize: 
H5A. All else equal, there will be greater firm-originated media coverage for firms that 
have hired an external IR consultant, as compared to a matched sample of firms that do not have 
an external IR.  
Furthermore, I conjecture that IR would help to generate less negative news (or, more 
positive news) for the firm and its management to instill positive sentiments in the market. 
Hence, 
H5B. All else equal, there will be less negative sentiments (or, more positive sentiments) 
generated through the texts used in firm-originated news, for firms that have hired an external IR 
consultant, as compared to a matched sample of firms that do not have an external IR. 
 The following section introduces the data, discusses sample construction and presents 
summary statistics.  
  
31 
 
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
The period considered in this study is twelve years from 2003-2014. Several different 
databases have been used to extract the main variables and the control variables for this paper, 
and I describe them below: 
 
1. Investor Relation (IR) Firms’ Data 
The IR firm data was hand collected from physical copies of O'Dwyer's PR (Public 
Relations) firms’ annual directories (2003-2014). O'Dwyer's PR firms’ annual directories have 
been published since 1971 and contain information on firms in the public relations industry 
including fees (either audited by a Certified Public Accountant or carrying full endorsement of 
the CPA firms which is often referred to as an “agreed-upon-procedure”), rankings, 
specializations (including investor relations), clients etc. Although Solomon (2012) and Gurun 
(2016) have used this data source in their papers, using O'Dwyer's PR firms’ annual directories 
has several challenges. First, the directories contain information on PR firms. Therefore, I 
manually select only those PR firms that mention IR as one of their specializations. When there 
is ambiguity, I double check it by visiting their websites. For instance, in the year 2010, the total 
number of PR firms listed in the 2010 O'Dwyer directory is 1,700, amongst which only 148 are IR 
firms. Second, O'Dwyer's PR firms’ annual directories list both the private and public clients of 
the PR firms. I manually extract the public clients from those lists and match them with their 
corresponding Compustat names. For instance, 2010 O'Dwyer directory lists 7,700 clients, of 
which only 673 clients are publicly traded and had hired IR firms. Third, O'Dwyer directories use 
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general names or common acronyms of public firms instead of some unique firm identifier. There 
are many instances where the names are ambiguous. I sorted out such ambiguity using fuzzy text 
string matches and Google searches. My final sample consists of 2,336 different public firms that 
use one or more of 422 distinct external IR firms at some point during the sample period (2003-
2014). During this process, I also collected information on whether the activists in my sample are 
in the client lists of any IR firms so that I can identify those activists who also hired external IR 
consultants.   
Table I presents summary statistics of firms using IR. Panel A, column 1 presents the 
number of distinct external IR firms hired each year by publicly listed companies. Column 2 gives 
the number of Compustat firms that use external IR consultants each year during the sample 
period. And column 3 shows the percentage of Compustat population represented by these IR 
firms every year in terms of market capitalization. Several trends are worth noting in this table. 
As shown in Panel B and Panel C in Table I, the mean and median sizes of the firms that use 
external IR have stayed relatively stable over the years, both in terms of total assets and market 
capitalization respectively (adjusted for inflation). However, Panel D indicates that during the 
period from 2003 to 2014, it is the mid-cap and large-cap firms that have increasingly hired 
external IR consultants. At the same time, there is a clear decreasing trend in small cap firms in 
hiring an outside IR firm. Such trends suggest a plausibly important but yet unexplored role 
played by IR firms other than providing visibility and liquidity, as documented by Bushee and 
Miller (2012), since mid-cap and large-cap firms usually do not need help with visibility. 
Insert Table I here 
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The average age (calculated from year founded) and the average number of employees 
of these 422 IR firms is 30.3 years and 108.4 employees respectively. Other summary statistics 
for IR firms are given in Table II. Note that the average number of publicly listed clients annually 
per IR firm in the twelve-year period ranges from 4.21 to 6.08.11 The rankings of the IR firms in a 
particular year are based on the total annual fees generated in the prior year solely from the IR 
services provided by these firms. However, not all IR firms disclose their fees and hence this is 
one of the limitations of the rankings data provided by O'Dwyer directories. The total fees 
generated by the top-tier (top-20) IR firms every year varied from $90.9 million in 2003 to 
$184.80 million in 2014. Also, it is worth noting that although the number of clients using the 
top-tier IR firms every year decreased from 246 in 2003 to 150 in 2014, the average amount spent 
per year by a publicly listed client for hiring a top-tier IR firm steadily increased over the years 
from $369,515 (2003) to $1,232,024 (2014) as shown in Figure 2, which could be an indication of 
IR firms getting more specialized in their IR functions over the years. Karolyi and Liao (2017) 
estimate that the average value of total IR budget for firms, based on their survey conducted in 
2012, is $1.1 million which is very close to the average amount spent per year per client to hire 
top-tier IR firms during the more recent years (2011-2014) as shown in Table II. 
Insert Table II here 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2 also depicts the rising trend in the number of shareholder activism campaigns I 
collected from SEC filings during the sample period (detailed descriptions on the activism 
                                                          
11 The client list in the O’Dwyer directory includes both IR and PR clients. And no information has been provided on 
the specific services requested by each of their clients.   
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campaign data are discussed in the following section). Note that the trend follows a similar path 
as that of the average amount spent per year by a publicly listed client on hiring a top-tier IR firm 
as shown in the same figure. It indicates that over the last twelve years both the amount spent 
on external IR and shareholder activism have risen concomitantly.  
 
2. Activism Campaign Data 
I crawled publicly available SEC-EDGAR’s electronic filing system using simple Python 
programs and downloaded all the proxies and information statements filed with the SEC between 
Jan 1st, 2003 and Dec 31st, 2014.12 The most important ones in terms of retrieving activism 
campaign data in this paper are the Schedule 13D, Schedule 13D/A (Amendment to Schedule 13D 
filings in case there are any “material” changes to initial 13D filings), preliminary (PREC 14A & 
PREN 14A), definitive (DFAN 14A & DEFN 14A) proxy statements filed and the notice of exempt 
solicitation (PX14A6G). Schedule 13D is required to be filed by any investor who attains an 
ownership of 5% or more of voting shares of a public company within 10 days of such a 
transaction and would like to reserve the right of pursuing an activist strategy. PREC 14A is a 
preliminary proxy statement containing contested solicitations, and PREN 14A are non-
management preliminary proxy statements not involving contested solicitations. DFAN 14A and 
DEFN 14A are definitive proxy statements filed by non-management. My final list of activism 
events is based on the intent of the 13D filer disclosed under the “purpose of transaction” section 
of 13Ds. Note that not all 13D filers intend to pursue an activist strategy. Then, I merged the data 
                                                          
12 There were 365,260 such proxy and information filings made with the SEC during this time period. More 
specifically, 51,658 Schedule 13Ds; 113,821 Schedule 13D/As; 388 PREN 14As; 11,902 DFAN 14As; 313 DEFN 14As 
and the rest, other SEC form types related to proxy and information filings.  
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with my sample, and the propensity score matched sample (as described in detail in the next sub-
section) using their SEC Central Index Key (CIK).  
Shareholder activists challenge the status quo of a target firm in different ways and stages 
which I have broadly classified into two categories, namely, private negotiations and public 
negotiations as shown in Figure 1. Private negotiations are less costly for both the sides, i.e., the 
activist and the incumbent management, but the chances of success for the activist is also 
considerably lower. Such private negotiations can take place both before and after 13D filings. 
As recognized by Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), private negotiations or nonpublic 
activist campaigns can also be initiated by hedge funds that do not cross the threshold of 5% 
ownership and hence do not appear in the 13D filings. Their sample is restricted to 13D filings by 
activist hedge funds only, however, they also complement their sample with activism campaigns 
by hedge funds that do not cross a threshold of 5%. External IR firms can play a role during such 
private negotiations (it is unobservable from publicly available data and hence has not been 
included in this study), but I argue that the role of external IR is likely to be more important in 
public negotiations.  
Public negotiations begin once the private negotiations have failed and I have further 
categorized them into exempt solicitations, stockholder campaigns, and finally the last resort for 
activists, i.e., the proxy fights. Exempt solicitations are different from actual contested proxy 
fights as they do not require the activist or the dissident to comply with the SEC proxy filings and 
to provide their own proxy card. It is simply a public communication (usually through the notice 
of exempt solicitation or PX14A6G) with other shareholders persuading them to vote one way or 
the other on a resolution. Stockholder campaigns are public communications facilitated through 
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publicly disclosed letters sent to the management, press releases, and television interviews and 
almost always through 13D filings. Therefore, I start with the 13D filings and then search the 
internet for news articles related to such campaigns. These campaigns are like threats to 
management, pressuring them to take certain actions such as increasing dividends or share 
buybacks, divesting, etc. If stockholder campaigns fail, it might lead to proxy fights, which are 
actual voting contests. Finally, I manually collect the voting outcomes of proxy fights from 8-K 
and 10-Q filings. 
Table III shows the summary statistics of the activism campaign data during 2003-2014 
for firms without external IR (Panel A) and firms with external IR (Panel B) that were targeted 
during this period. It further classifies all the public activism campaigns as exempt solicitations, 
stockholder campaigns, and proxy fights. There was an increasing trend in the total number of 
activism campaigns in the last twelve years for both the firms with external IR and the firms 
without external IR.    
Insert Table III here 
 
3. Firm-Level Data 
Data on firm return and volatility come from CRSP, and firm-specific accounting data was 
obtained from Compustat. Investor portfolio data and analyst data was collected from Thomson’s 
13f filings and I/B/E/S respectively. Following Bushee (2001) and Appel, Gormley and Keim 
(2016), I define quasi-indexers as passive institutional investors and transient and dedicated 
institutional investors as non-passive. 
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Table IV-a compares the descriptive statistics at the firm-year level of the various 
accounting variables of the firms that use external IR (Panel B) versus the firms that do not (Panel 
A). On average, the firms that use IR during the sample period are significantly larger, both in 
terms of total assets and revenues, use significantly more external financing, have higher 
operating cash flows and they also have a higher number of analysts following them. Table IV-a 
further explores the differences between these two sets of firms in terms of institutional 
ownership and ownership concentration. Both the number of block owners that is greater than 
5% and the number of institutional owners from 13F filings, are significantly larger for firms using 
IR. It also appears that firms using IR have significantly higher institutional ownership, but lower 
ownership concentration given by HHI index, that is, more dispersed institutional ownership. 
Firms using IR also have significantly less insider ownership. They also appear to have higher 
active institutional ownership in the univariate results as shown in Table IV-a. Overall, it seems 
that there are systematic differences between firms that hire external IR and firms that do not. 
Therefore, I use a propensity score matched sample for all the empirical analyses conducted in 
this paper. 
Insert Table IV-a here 
Specifically, I use propensity score matching to construct a matched sample for my sample 
firms with external IR, based on the following firm characteristics: market value, market-to-book 
ratio, and ROA. In other words, I first match on the propensity to hire an external IR, and then 
test whether the presence of an IR is associated with a firm being targeted by an activist. 
Therefore, for each firm in my sample that has an external IR (treated firm), I have a propensity 
score-matched firm from the same year and industry that does not have an external IR (untreated 
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firm) and serves as a de facto counterfactual. Table IV-b shows that the firm characteristics of the 
matched sample are not significantly different from those of the treated sample, for both mean 
(reported) and median (unreported), not only in the three matched characteristics, but also in 
sales growth, leverage, dividend yield, R&D, Institutional ownership, and E-Index that have been 
documented in the extant literature to be correlated with the probability of a firm hiring an 
external IR. Put differently, empirical tests run in the paper use treatment and control groups 
that are balanced, with the same distribution of observed covariates and therefore plausibly also 
in unobserved characteristics. 
Insert Table IV-b here 
 
4. Media Coverage Data 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) identify two distinct categories of news sources on 
corporations. The first one is independent news coverage that includes major newspapers and 
business publications such as the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Financial 
Times, etc. The second category is the firm originated news coverage, primarily available through 
newswires such as the Reuters, the Business newswires, the PR Newswire, etc. I focus on firm-
originated news as it can be reasoned that it is this category of news that can be directly impacted 
or managed by the corporation or its designated IR. I use Factiva to search articles sourced from 
the different newswires. To proxy for media coverage generated, I simply calculate the number 
of articles and take the natural log (1 + # of articles) following Solomon (2012). In order to proxy 
for sentiments generated, I use Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) positive and negative word lists 
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and follow their methodology to measure tone for each of the articles using the formula: Tone = 
(Number of Negative Words – Number of Positive Words) / Total Number of Words. 
 
5. Mutual Funds Voting Data 
Mutual funds and other registered management investment companies are required to 
file Form N-PX with the SEC, no later than August 31 of each year, providing information on their 
proxy voting records for the most recent twelve-month period ending June 30 of each year. 
Under the Item 1 of their proxy voting record on N-PX filings, mutual funds are also required to 
report whether they cast their vote for or against the incumbent management of their investee 
company.  
Since Form N-PX filing has been made mandatory for mutual funds in the year 2003, I 
began by searching and collecting all Form N-PX filings using SEC-EDGAR’s electronic filing system 
during my sample period from 2003 to 2014. During this time-period, a total of 36,324 N-PX filings 
and its amendments were filed with the SEC. In order to identify mutual funds amongst all these 
filers, I used CRSP mutual fund database. I used mutual fund names from the CRSP database and 
match them to the registrant’s name on the N-PX filing. In case of ambiguity, I manually checked 
their addresses as given in the CRSP mutual fund database and on the N-PX filing. If there was 
still ambiguity, I did not include that mutual fund. Finally, I manually collected the voting 
information from the N-PX filings of the mutual funds. 
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6. Investor Day and Investor Conference Data 
Following Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi (2014) and Kirk and Markov (2016), I hand-
collected a comprehensive sample of analyst/investor days and broker-hosted investor 
conferences from Bloomberg and Capital IQ terminals using their firm-level events calendar for 
my sample and the matched sample for the period 2003-2014. My final sample of 
analyst/investor days was comprised of 650 analyst/investor days hosted by 464 distinct firms. 
And, the final sample of investor conferences consisted of 2,736 investor conferences attended 
by 1,577 unique firms. 
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V. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND MAIN RESULTS 
 
1. Results on IR and Activism 
Table V tests my first hypothesis, H1A, in a logistic regression model where the dependent 
variable is a campaigns dummy (i.e., 1 = targeted in an activism campaign and 0 = not targeted in 
an activism campaign) and the main independent variable is whether the incumbent 
management has hired an external IR firm or not. The multivariate empirical design here is 
intended to test if there is a negative association between a publicly listed company’s probability 
of being a target of shareholder activism and its use of an external IR consultant. If there is such 
a negative relation, that would be consistent with the hypothesis that hiring an external IR 
consultant helps firms to reduce their probability of being targeted in future.  
Insert Table V here 
Four models are tested for various time periods (in years) after the external IR firm was 
brought on board by the incumbent management. The results of Model 1 show that for firms 
that have hired external IR, the log-odds of being a target of shareholder activism within the 
sample period decreases by 0.155. The results are similar when we look at the shareholder 
activism within the next two or three years in Model 2 and Model 3, even though there is a 
decrease in the magnitude of the coefficients. Interestingly, this negative association is not 
significant when we only look at the shareholder activism within one year after an external IR is 
hired, as shown in Model 4. It seems that it takes some time for the external IR to make a 
difference in preventing their client firms from being targeted.  
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Overall, the results in Table V are consistent with the hypothesis that external IR 
consultants help in reducing a company’s likelihood of being targeted by an activist. I include the 
lagged values of the firm characteristics that have been found to influence the likelihood of a firm 
being an activist’s target in the extant literature (Brav, Jiang and Kim, 2009; Brav, Jiang and Kim, 
2015) in all specifications. The signs of the coefficients for these controls are also consistent with 
the prior literature. For instance, target firms tend to have lower market value, higher leverage, 
lower market-to-book ratio, lower sales growth, lower ROA, lower dividend yield, lower R&D, 
higher institutional ownership, and higher liquidity. All tests in Table V have been conducted 
using a matched sample, with industry and year fixed effects, and clustering at the firm level. 
While using a propensity score matched sample ensures that the treated (i.e., firms with external 
IR) and the control firms (i.e., firms without external IR) are similar in observable firm 
characteristics that determine the use of an external IR, the different fixed effects attempt to 
control for the unobservable factors. Finally, clustering at the firm level accounts for a possible 
serial correlation. 
Table VI reports the results for hypothesis H1B, where I test whether there is a negative 
association between the number of activism campaigns and the use of an external IR by a firm. 
Here, the sample only includes firms that have been targeted by activists. I hypothesize that if 
external IR firms are truly making a difference in coping with activism, it should also be reflected 
as a reduction in the number of campaigns. I test my hypothesis in four different models that are 
presented in Table VI. Model 1 of Table VI is an OLS model with the number of activism campaigns 
as the dependent variable, and the IR dummy as the main variable of interest on the right-hand 
side. The results depict that firms that have hired an external IR have 0.13 fewer campaigns than 
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those firms that have not hired external IR, holding all the other independent variables constant. 
These results are significant at the 5% level. Model 1 controls for industry fixed effects and model 
2 is the same specification but also controls for year fixed effects. The results of model 2 are 
similar to model 1, also significant at the 5% level. It can be argued that since the dependent 
variable in this specification is a count variable, it is imperative that we use a Poisson regression. 
Hence, I re-estimate the regressions using Poisson models in specifications 3 and 4. The signs and 
significance levels of the coefficients of the IR dummy stay the same indicating a negative 
association between the number of activism campaigns and the use of an external IR by a firm 
which is robust to the use of controls.  
Insert Table VI here 
The next set of results focus on the actual outcomes of activism campaigns that have been 
manually collected from SEC filings. I further classify the campaign outcomes into three 
categories: management wins, activist or dissident wins, and settlements. In case of settlements, 
it covers mainly two scenarios: 1) Activists get partially what they ask for, for example, activists 
ask the company to grant them board seats and also to increase dividend payout, but eventually, 
the company agrees to one of the conditions, board seats or dividends, but not both; 2) Activists 
do not get what they ask for, but are compensated with something else. For instance, activists 
ask the company to divest or sell itself, but the company rejects the proposal. Instead, the 
company is willing to review its strategic alternatives or grant activists board representation. It 
can be argued that settlements to a certain degree are a partial win for both sides, even more so 
for management.  
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I hypothesize a positive association between firms with external IR and their campaign 
outcomes as a management win as compared to settlement or dissident win in hypothesis H1C 
and test this hypothesis using an ordered logit model where the dependent variable is 
management win, settlement (partial win for both management and dissident), or activist win. 
The main independent variable is whether the targeted firm has hired an external IR consultant 
or not. The results are reported in Table VII Panel A. Model 1 in Panel A includes all types of 
activism campaigns. Then, I categorize activism type into exempt solicitations, stockholder 
campaigns, and proxy fights as described in sample construction and data section. In Model 2, I 
exclude proxy fights to see whether there is any differential effect for those activism campaigns 
that do not lead to proxy fights. In Model 3, I exclude exempt solicitation because this type of 
campaign is not always reflected through 13D filings, hence the data is likely to be incomplete, 
and the information might not be accurate. As presented in the table, even though the 
coefficients of all models are positive, they are not significant.   
Insert Table VII here 
In a recently published theoretical paper, Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) argue using a 
stylized game-theoretic model that shareholder activism, more often than not, is initiated and is 
more effective by only certain types of active institutional owners such as hedge funds rather 
than mutual funds. Therefore, I further categorize all the dissidents each year into the most 
prolific activists (e.g., hedge funds) and less prolific activists (e.g., mutual funds) based on the 
number of campaigns they initiated in the prior year. I include the top fifty such activists in the 
most prolific list and the rest as non-prolific activists. Following this, I repeat the regressions used 
in Panel A, for campaigns by prolific activists and campaigns by non-prolific activists separately. 
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The results are reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table VII respectively. It appears that the IR 
firms are indeed effective when dealing with non-prolific activists (Panel B), but not so much 
when dealing with prolific activists (Panel C). As shown in Model 4, which is for all campaigns by 
non-prolific activists, I find that using an external IR firm raises the predicted log odds of a 
management win by 0.867, which is significant at a 5% level. Moreover, when we exclude proxy 
fights from the campaigns (i.e., Model 5), such a log odds increase is even higher at 0.995 
(significant at the 1% level). However, as shown in Panel C, IR is not able to influence the outcome 
of activism campaigns initiated by prolific activists. Such results indicate that IR firms perhaps 
influence the results of activism campaigns, but only when the dissident is a non-prolific activist. 
Trading volume reactions to the announcement of activism campaigns can provide useful 
insights into the divergence of opinion across investors. Using proprietary limit order and market 
order data, Garfinkel (2009) shows that unexpected trading volume is the best proxy for 
divergence of opinion. Prior research on the theory of trading volume also hints in the similar 
direction. For instance, Karpoff (1986) concludes that unexpected trading volume can indicate 
divergence of opinion amongst investors in two distinct manners. It could either imply 
heterogeneous interpretation of the same information, or it could insinuate heterogeneous prior 
expectations. Either way, unexpected or abnormal trading volume, proxies for the lack of 
consensus in opinion amongst investors. If one believes that the use of external IR firms can help 
diminish such divergence in opinions, then we should find a significantly less unexpected trading 
volume on the announcement of activism campaigns that target companies with IR consultants 
as compared to companies without IR consultants.  
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To empirically test it, I first retrieve daily trading volume data from CRSP around the 
announcement of activism for firms with external IR and firms without external IR. Then, I 
compute the mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) around the announcement of 
activism campaigns for six different event windows: (0,+1), (-1,+1), (-2,+2), (-5,+5), (-10,+10) and 
(-20,+20). Abnormal trading volume has been computed as the difference between the actual 
log-transformed volume and the expected market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) log-
transformed volume over these windows following prior literature (Campbell and Wasley, 1996). 
Following Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), I estimate the market model using 60 days of 
daily trading volumes ending 40 days prior to the activism campaign announcement date. The 
results of such an event study on trading volume are presented in Table VIII. 
Insert Table VIII here 
Panel A of Table VIII presents the results of such volume event study for activism 
campaigns conducted by prolific activists. For three windows, i.e., (-5,+5), (-10,+10) and (-20,+20), 
the mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) are significantly less for firms with 
external IR, indicating that IR functions may have helped in reducing divergence in opinions. Also, 
note that in case of activism by non-prolific activists, such differences as given by the p-values on 
the last column are significant at the 1% level for all six different windows (Panel B of Table VIII). 
Given that the mean cumulative abnormal trading volumes (CATVs) are significantly less for firms 
with external IR for all the windows in case of non-prolific activists, it suggests that IR firms are 
more effective in dealing with non-prolific activists as compared to prolific activists.   
Finally, I empirically test hypothesis H1D, to explore the relation between the presence 
of an external IR consultant on management’s side and support of the other institutional 
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investors for management during proxy voting. I run logit regressions on a propensity score 
matched sample with the dependent variable being a dummy variable indicating whether mutual 
funds vote with management on a certain proposal and the main independent variable of 
interest, the IR Dummy. The results are provided in Table IX.  
Insert Table IX here 
As shown in Table IX, while Model 1 includes all different types of shareholder proposals, 
Model 2 only includes proposals on the election of directors. This is because shareholder activists 
often settle on getting a director on the board as a first step to facilitate other operational, 
financial or strategic changes (Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang and Keusch, 2017). However, the results from 
both these models show that mutual funds are significantly more likely to vote with management 
on shareholder proposals if management has hired an external IR consultant. Such results are 
another indication of the role played by external IR firms in garnering support for management 
from other influential large shareholders in activist situations.   
The next set of tests focus on the possible channels through which IR firms are making 
differences in helping management with shareholder activism. 
 
2. Results on IR and Active Interactions between Management and Investors  
As mentioned earlier, private meetings with key institutional investors can play a critical 
role in impacting the preemptive channel. Unfortunately, the details of such meetings are not 
publicly observable to an empiricist. Some researchers (Soltes, 2014; Solomon and Soltes, 2015) 
have been able to access proprietary data on such private meetings. Such studies provide us with 
crucial clinical evidence with the caveat of the lack of external validity.  
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Since I do not observe information on private meetings, I focus on other key face-to-face 
(publicly available) interactions between the management and institutional investors/analysts. 
Particularly, I focus on two such important interactions between the management and influential 
investors, where the IR functions of firms play a crucial part, namely, investor/analyst days and 
broker-hosted investor conferences: 
1. Investor/Analyst Days: Investor/Analyst days are organized by the IR function of a firm, 
where key institutional investors and analysts get access to management at either the corporate 
head office or a major investment center such as New York City, Chicago or San Francisco. Such 
events can typically cost the firm from $30,000 and up to $250,000 and are planned for half a 
day to one and a half days (Kirk and Markov, 2016).  In organizing such days, it is the IR firm, in 
conjunction with senior management, that decides the location, agenda, list of invitees and 
speakers and events for the day. Note that this is different from broker-hosted investor 
conferences, as in this case, it is the management and its IR consultants, who get to decide which 
current or potential institutional investors or analysts to target and invite for such events. 
Although the presentations and discussions during an analyst/investor day are posted online for 
all investors in accordance with the Regulation FD requirements, opportunities for interacting in 
person with senior and mid-level management, key operational managers, suppliers and buyers 
of a firm is incredibly valuable for institutional investors.   
To test whether firms with external IR consultants organize investor/analyst days more 
aggressively, I run a logit regression on matched sample with dependent variable as a dummy 
indicating whether the firm organized an investor/analyst day. The results are reported in Model 
1 of Table X.   
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Insert Table X here 
Consistent with the hypothesis that external IR firms facilitate greater interaction with 
institutional investors, Model 1 shows that firms that hire external IR firms are significantly more 
likely to organize and hold such investor/analyst days. For a firm that has hired an external IR, 
the log odds of organizing investor/analyst days increases by 0.24, significant at the 5% level. 
However, these results do not rule out the possibility that IR is hired in response to the increasing 
demand for interaction between management and institutional investors.   
2. Broker-Hosted Investor Conferences: Broker-hosted investor conferences is another 
channel through which IR firms and their clients can offer institutional investors an opportunity 
for face-to-face conversations. Although such conferences are organized by the brokerage firms 
to cater to the research needs of their major institutional clients, many public companies take a 
keen interest in such opportunities as they perceive them to be an important investor relations 
activity (Green, Jame, Markov, and Subasi, 2014).  
I hypothesize that firms with external IR consultants are more likely to participate in 
investor conferences. I test my hypothesis by running a logit regression on matched sample with 
dependent variable as a dummy indicating whether the firm participated in an investor 
conference. The results are reported in Model 2 of Table X. Note that firms that hire external IR 
firms are significantly more likely to participate in broker-hosted investor conferences. For a firm 
that has hired an external IR, the log odds of being a participant at an investor conference 
increases by 0.42, significant at the 5% level.   
Such invitation-only selective interactions between the management and influential 
investors can be beneficial to both the groups. While on the one hand, the current and potential 
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key institutional investors get to meet the management in a one-to-one and small group setting, 
on the other hand, it gives an opportunity to the firm to focus and target its investor relations 
efforts where it could matter the most. According to NIRI, IR consultants are trained and careful 
not to release any material information and violate Regulation FD requirements during such 
meetings. However, it can be argued that these selected investors have a better opportunity for 
assessing the verbal and nonverbal cues in such in-person meetings (Bushee, Jung, and Miller, 
2017).  
In addition to the investor/analyst days and the broker-hosted investor conferences, IR 
firms also help their client companies to organize “governance roadshows.” Governance 
roadshows are a recent but growing trend in investor relations and is targeted towards the 
largest shareholders.13 Since it a recent phenomenon, there is not enough data to test it formally. 
However, the objective of such governance roadshows is nicely encapsulated in a disclosure by 
Hewlett Packard Co. in their DEF 14A, 2014 filing,  
“As part of this governance outreach program, we conducted a governance roadshow 
enabling several of our directors to meet directly with major stockholders, and we initiated a 
director video interview series through which directors address specific issues of importance to 
stockholders, such as capital allocation, board dynamics and our overall compensation 
philosophy, via pre-recorded videos posted on our website.”14,15 
Another method that the management commonly employs to communicate with its 
company’s shareholders, including retail shareholders, is through sending written material in the 
                                                          
13 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lex-suvanto/governance-roadshows-adde_b_6506478.html 
14 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/0001047469-14-000517-index.htm 
15 Hewlett Packard Co. is in my sample and has hired multiple IR firms over the sample period of 2003-2014. 
51 
 
form of letters to all its shareholders, delineating reasons to vote in their favor. The Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) monitors such communications, and hence the management is 
required to file Form PX14A6G under the rule 14a-6(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
whenever, such communication is sent out to its shareholders.  
I hypothesize that if IR consultants facilitate more active communication with its 
investors, managers who have hired IR consultants would be more likely to send written 
materials to its shareholders, as recorded in the Form PX14A6G. To test it empirically, I search 
SEC-EDGAR’s electronic filing system and retrieve such filings, which are often also known as the 
notice of exempt solicitation. I use it as a dummy in a multivariate regression, where the PX14A6G 
dummy indicates whether a firm has filed at least one PX14A6G report with the SEC during that 
year. The results have been provided in model 3 of Table X. The results show that managers that 
have hired external IR consultants, indicated by the IR dummy, are significantly more likely to 
send written materials to all its shareholders. This is yet further evidence that companies with 
external IR consultants try to communicate and engage with their shareholders.  
 
3. Possible Consequences on Ownership  
I test hypotheses H3A and H3B that posit a negative/positive association between 
average individual institutional ownership and the use of an external IR consultant, and 
hypotheses H4A and H4B that predict a negative (non-negative) association between active 
(passive) institutional ownership and the use of an external IR. I apply propensity score matching 
to find matched control firms for my sample with external IR consultants, based on various firm 
characteristics (e.g., market value, market-to-book ratio, and ROA for firms in the same year and 
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industry) that have been found to be correlated with the probability of a firm hiring an external 
IR consultant.  
To start with, I look at the association between institutional ownership and the use of an 
external IR. I also include controls that have been used in the extant literature (Karolyi and Liao, 
2017) and have been known to influence institutional ownership. The results are reported in the 
first three columns of Table XI. In Model 1, the dependent variable is institutional ownership as 
a percentage of total shares outstanding. The results indicate that there is a negative association 
between institutional ownership and the use of external IR. I further classify institutional owners 
into active and passive, as defined in Bushee (2001) and Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016). Model 
2, which has active institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding) as the 
dependent variable, shows that the negative association found in Model 1 is likely due to the 
lower active institutional ownership of firms with external IR, because there is no significant 
difference in the passive institutional ownership between firms with and without external IR as 
shown in Model 3.  
Insert Table XI here 
In the next step, I look at the relationship between the number of institutional ownership 
and the use of external IR.16 The results are presented in the last three columns of Table XI. In 
Model 4 of Table XI, the dependent variable is the number of institutional owners, and the main 
variable of interest on the right-hand side is the IR dummy indicating whether the firm uses an 
external IR or not. This model shows that a firm that has hired an external IR has nearly 30 more 
                                                          
16 In untabulated results, I also use log (1+number of institutional owners) instead of the number of institutional 
owners and the results are similar. 
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institutional owners than a firm which has not hired any external IR. Moreover, these multivariate 
results are significant at the 1% level. Model 5 and model 6 have the number of active 
institutional owners and the number of passive institutional owners respectively as dependent 
variables. A firm that has hired an external IR firm has approximately 3 more active institutional 
owners and 26 more passive institutional owners. 
To further mitigate the endogeneity issue due to selection bias, I adopt a difference-in-
differences methodology. Using propensity score matching (i.e., size, market-to-book ratio, and 
ROA), I construct two groups of firms, one with external IR and the other, a matched sample 
without external IR. The year when a firm hires an external IR is also used as the “pseudo” hiring 
year for their matched firm. The results are shown in Table XII. The coefficient on the interaction 
term between IR Dummy and Post-IR Dummy captures the differential changes in institutional 
ownership in firms after hiring IR, compared to that for their matched firms. Columns 1 to 3 show 
that hiring of IR does lead to a reduction in active institutional ownership while maintaining 
overall institutional ownership as well as passive institutional ownership. Moreover, columns 4 
to 6 show that hiring of IR does increase the number of institutional owners for the firm, and this 
increase is due to the increase in the number of passive, not active institutional owners.      
Insert Table XII here 
Combined with the results in the prior table, it seems that even though IR firms are able 
to attract more institutional owners, the institutional ownership tends to be lower, making them 
more manageable. IR firms’ differential impacts on active versus passive institutional investors 
are also worth noting in the difference-in-differences set-up, as they indicate that IR firms not 
only attract relatively more passive institutional investors but also try to reduce active ownership 
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that is more likely to initiate activism campaigns. An alternative way to interpret the results is 
through the theoretical arguments of Merton (1987) and Miller (1977). It can be argued that if 
external IR firms are instrumental in expanding the breadth of ownership amongst the 
institutional owners, they should also attract more individual owners. The results indirectly 
suggest an increase in the number of retail owners.  
 
4. Results on IR and Media Coverage and Tone  
The following tests investigate the second channel, that is, managing media, through 
which IR firms are plausibly enabling their client companies’ management to influence public 
opinion. The sets of analyses in this section test hypothesis H5A, that there is greater media 
coverage for public corporations that have an external IR. In this section, I also test hypothesis 
H5B, that there are significantly fewer negative sentiments (i.e., more positive sentiments) 
generated through the texts used in media if the companies have an external IR. 
For all the tests in this section, I focus only on company generated news or press releases 
on PR Newswire found in Factiva, as the company and its IR consultants have full control over the 
timing and choice of words in such public news releases as compared to a news item written 
about the firm by an objective journalist, working for instance, at the Wall Street Journal. Based 
on a recent survey study on 610 investor relations officers representing publicly traded U.S. 
companies, Brown, Call, and Clement (2018) find that IR personnel have a major influence in 
preparing company issued press releases. Hence, I collect the total number of such press news 
releases from Factiva. However, for the analyses of press release tones, I double check and 
download those press releases directly from firms’ websites’ IR sections (or the press release 
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sections on the company websites) which is a more direct evidence that IR is playing a causal role 
in such press releases. Press releases that are not found on the firms’ websites are not included 
for tonal analyses. Unlike Solomon (2012), who only analyzes the tone of the article headline and 
the lead paragraphs, I analyze the tone of the entire press releases.  
I utilize Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) positive and negative word lists and measure 
the negative tone of each press release using the formula below: 
Negative Tone = (# Negative Words - # Positive Words)/Total # Words17 
In the first set of tests conducted in Table XIII, I run the following OLS regressions on the 
propensity score matched sample, with the dependent variable as Ln (1 + # of articles): 
Ln (1 + # of articles) = β0 + β1*IRFirm + β2*Controls + ε  
and, 
Ln (1 + # of articles) = β0 + β1*IRFirm + β2*Tone + β3*IRFirm*Tone + β4*Controls + ε  
Insert Table XIII here 
The goal of these tests is to examine whether the presence of an external IR consultant 
disproportionally increases firm generated news and more positively toned press releases. The 
main independent variables of interest in these models are the IR Dummy, indicating whether 
the firm has an external IR firm and the interaction term between the IR Dummy and Negative 
Tone. The controls include market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, sales growth, return on 
assets, leverage, dividend yield, R&D, institutional ownership, liquidity, analyst coverage, stock 
volatility and stock return. All models also incorporate industry and year fixed effects, and the 
regressions are clustered at the firm level. While in Model 1 and Model 2, the sample includes all 
                                                          
17 The results are similar if the press release negative tone is defined as # Negative Words/Total # Words. 
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company generated press releases, Model 3 and Model 4 are restricted only to non-repeated 
press releases. 
Model 1 in Table XIII reports that firms with external IR consultants provide significantly 
more press releases. The coefficient on the IR dummy in Model 1 is 0.227, significant at the 1% 
level, which means that on an average, firms with external IR consultants are associated with 
22.7% more PR news coverage. In Model 2, I append the original specification of Model 1 with 
Negative Tone variable and the interaction term between the IR Dummy and Negative Tone. In 
this model, firm issued press releases that are not found on the company’s websites or that have 
a neutral tone are not included. The results of Model 2 report that firms with external IR 
consultants are not only associated with 58.1% (significant at the 1% level) more press releases, 
but also that the coverage reduces (coefficient on the interaction term is -0.769, significant at 
the 10% level) when the tone gets more negative.  Models 3 and 4 in Table XIII rerun the analyses 
with only non-repeated press releases. The results reported in both these models corroborate 
that there is a significant increase in the company generated press releases when a company has 
an external IR firm. 
In the next set of results, I explore the possible impact of hiring an external IR firm, on the 
company generated press releases, by analyzing press releases one year before and after the 
year of hiring of an external IR using a difference-in-differences methodology. The results are 
shown in Table XIV, and the OLS regressions ran on propensity score matched sample are: 
 Ln (1 + # of articles) = β0 + β1*IRFirm + β2*Post-Hiring IRFirm + β3*IRFirm*Post-Hiring IRFirm + 
β4*Controls + ε  
and, 
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Negative Tone = β0 + β1*IRFirm + β2*Post-Hiring IRFirm + β3*IRFirm*Post-Hiring IRFirm + 
β4*Controls + ε  
Insert Table XIV here 
 While in Model 1, the dependent variable is the natural log of (1 + # of press release 
articles), that proxies for company generated press release coverage, in Model 2, the dependent 
variable is the negative tone of such press releases. The main variable of interest on the right-
hand side of both these models is the coefficient on the interaction term, β3.  
 The results in Model 1 show that after hiring an external IR firm, there is significantly 
more news coverage via firm press releases even after adding all controls (coefficient on the 
interaction term is 0.236, significant at the 1% level). Moreover, Model 2 shows that significantly 
less negatively toned news is generated (coefficient on the interaction term is -0.007, significant 
at the 10% level) post-hiring.  
 In the following set of analyses, I test the change in company released media coverage 
around the activism campaign announcement dates. Such tests can provide an even more direct 
evidence on the public negotiation channel via media. The results are reported in Table XV. 
Insert Table XV here 
Model 1 uses an OLS regression on a matched sample, where the dependent variable is 
news coverage, given by the natural log of (1 + # of press release articles), one-year pre- and post- 
activism announcement. The main independent variable of interest is the IR dummy. The results 
show that firms that have an external IR generate a significantly greater number of press releases 
(coefficient on the IR Dummy is 0.701, significant at the 5% level). The results in Model 2, where 
the dependent variable is news coverage, given by the natural log of (1 + # of press release 
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articles), six months pre- and post- activism announcement are similar (coefficient on the IR 
Dummy is 0.695, significant at the 10% level).     
These results are robust to the use of various controls used in the extant literature and all 
the models are clustered at the firm level with industry and year fixed effects. However, these 
results do not fully rule out the possibility that firms that have more information to communicate 
to investors hire IR. 
 
5. Valuation Impact of IR 
5.1 Announcement of Hiring IR 
In this section, I conduct several tests on how the market responds to the use of IR by a 
firm. These tests help us understand whether the market perceives the use of external IR 
consultant as value-enhancing to shareholders or does it think that IR entrenches the incumbent 
management. I begin by testing the market reactions to the announcements of hiring an external 
IR by a firm. The exact dates of announcements of hiring external IRs have been manually 
collected from news articles and different SEC filings of firms. Since not all firms publicly 
announce the hiring of IR, I find only 52 such IR hiring announcement dates. I conduct short-term 
event studies around such announcements using six different symmetric and variable event 
windows in days ([0,1], [0,2], [-1,+1], [-1,+2], [-2,+2], and [-5,+5]). 
Table XVI presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the 
announcements of hiring an external IR. The IR-hiring announcement returns have been 
computed using the abnormal returns as the difference between the actual stock price return 
and the expected market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows indicated 
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in the first column. The market model has been estimated using 100 days of daily returns ending 
40 days before the announcement date of hiring an IR. I also report both the Patell Z-statistic and 
the corresponding p-value. I find that overall the market responds negatively to the 
announcement of hiring external IR (even though not all statistically significant), indicating that 
the market perceives that the dominant effect of external IR is to entrench management at the 
expense of shareholders. 
Insert Table XVI here 
 
5.2 Announcement of Activism Campaign 
The next set of tests analyze both the short-term and long-term valuation impacts of using 
external IR firms. One view is that since external IR firms are hired by management to support 
their agenda during activism situations, they help to entrench the incumbent management. 
Another view holds that contrary to management, who are long-term focused, shareholder 
activists are usually short-term focused and having a communication specialist such as an IR firm 
on management’s side enhances the long-term value for firms. I test these competing 
conjectures by measuring both short-term price reactions around the announcement of 
shareholder activism and the market adjusted buy-and-hold long-term abnormal returns over 
the course an activism intervention.    
To tease out the differential impact of IR consultants on activism campaigns, I conduct 
sub-sample analyses of short-term event studies comparing firms with and without IR on 
campaigns led by prolific versus non-prolific activists. The results for the short-term valuation 
impact are presented in Table XVII-a. Panel A shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns 
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(CARs) using market model around the announcement of activism campaigns initiated by prolific 
activists for six different event windows in days ([0,1], [0,2], [-1,+1], [-1,+2], [-2,+2], and [-5,+5]). 
I further separate the sample into the target firm that does and does not hire an external IR. The 
mean CARs are positive and significant for both groups varying from 1.52% to 4.40%, which is in 
line with the extant literature (Brav, Jiang and Kim (2015)), and they are not statistically different 
as indicated by the p-value in differences in the last column. I conduct the same analysis in Panel 
B but include only those activism campaigns that were initiated by non-prolific activists. In this 
case, although the mean CARs are still positive and significant for both groups, the magnitudes 
are significantly different as shown by the p-value in the last column. I find similar results for all 
event windows. Such short-term event study results indicate that the markets anticipate the 
differential impacts that an external IR consultant can have in managing shareholder activism led 
by prolific versus non-prolific activists. Such results might also suggest that in some cases, IR 
functions can accentuate management entrenchment. 
Insert Table XVII-a here 
Table XVII-b extends the analysis to longer-term windows to test the long-term valuation 
impacts of the presence of IR consultants in activism situations. Panel A of Table XVII-b presents 
the results on activism campaigns led by prolific activists, both with and without external IR. I use 
six different event windows in months ([-1,-1], [-1,0], [-1,+1], [-1,+6], [-1,+12], and [-1,+18]). The 
choice of these month-windows is motivated by the extant literature (Greenwood and Schor 
(2009)) and by the fact that the average holding period of activists is close to two years (Brav, 
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)). Long-term abnormal returns have been computed as the 
difference between the actual stock price return and the expected market model (CRSP Value 
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Weighted Index) return over the windows indicated in the first column. Market model has been 
estimated using monthly returns ending three months prior to the announcement date. The last 
column also reports the p-values by comparing the mean CARs of two firm groups with and 
without external IR. Panel A shows that even though the long-term cumulative abnormal returns 
are positive for both the firms with and without external IR, the differences are not significant. 
However, in Panel B, when the activists are non-prolific, five out of six windows show significantly 
lower long-term abnormal returns for firms with external IR, indicating that an external IR 
consultant can help to entrench the incumbent management when the activist is a non-prolific 
activist. Also, it is worth noting that the mean long-term cumulative abnormal returns are higher 
when the intervention is from a prolific activist versus a non-prolific activist, corroborating the 
results from the extant literature. 
Insert Table XVII-b here 
Overall, the results suggest that both the short-term and long-term valuation impacts of 
using external IR firms is negative, as it mutes the positive impact of the activist intervention, but 
only for non-prolific activists. This also indicates that the market correctly perceives that the 
external IR consultants are successful in helping management only when the intervention is from 
a non-prolific activist. 
 
5.3 Announcement of Activism Outcome – Management Winning 
So far, the tests conducted to estimate the valuation impact of IR were limited to the 
market response to IR-hiring and the announcements of shareholder activism campaigns. In this 
sub-section, I estimate the market responses to the actual outcomes of management wins in 
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activism battles for firms with and without IR. The idea here is to test whether the market 
perceives such IR-assisted management wins as entrenching managers or benefitting 
shareholders. The results are presented in Table XVIII. 
Insert Table XVIII here 
I have used the same six event windows as before and have followed the same 
methodology for the event studies as described in earlier tables. Panel A presents the results for 
firms without external IR and Panel B shows the mean CARs for firms with external IR. The results 
show that the announcements of external IR-assisted management wins are perceived negatively 
in the market. Such results are statistically significant and economically meaningful as the mean 
CAR can drop up to -1.20%. However, when the management win is without any help from an IR, 
the market perceives it to be value enhancing, as indicated by significant positive CARs. Such 
differences are significant as shown by the p-values presented in the last column of Table XVIII. 
Overall, such evidence suggests that management’s use of an external IR to cope with 
shareholder activism is perceived primarily as entrenching management and hence, value 
destroying. 
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VI. ROBUSTNESS 
 
1. Additional Controls 
In this section, I conduct the analyses with additional controls that could potentially affect 
the outcome of the activism campaigns: the proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, activists’ 
hiring of external IR, and firms’ stock return and stock volatility.   
 
1.1 Controlling for Proxy Advisory Firms’ Recommendations 
Proxy advisory firms such as the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and the Glass, 
Lewis & Co., the two leading proxy advisory services in the world, render advice to investors on 
how to vote in proxy battles. Recent studies from the extant finance literature have documented 
the role and influence of such proxy advisory firms on the voting behavior of institutional 
investors such as the mutual funds (e.g., Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011; Iliev and Lowry, 2014; 
Malenko and Shen, 2016). For instance, using a regression discontinuity design, Malenko and 
Shen (2016) document that a negative recommendation from Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) on the say-on-pay proposal can cause a 25-percentage point reduction in say-on-pay voting 
support.  
Therefore, in Table XIX, I test the relation between activism campaign outcomes and the 
use of external IR firm, after controlling for Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) or the Glass, 
Lewis & Co.’s support. It can be seen that the results stay qualitatively similar. Another interesting 
result to note in that table is that the coefficients on the Glass Lewis or ISS Support are only 
significant at 10% level in two out of nine models and only when the dissident is a non-prolific 
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activist. Such findings are along similar lines of a recent working paper by Aggarwal, Erel, and 
Starks (2018), who find that over time investors are increasingly ignoring the recommendations 
of proxy advisors, and are rather influenced by public opinion, as reflected in surveys and media.   
Insert Table XIX here 
 
1.2 Controlling for Activists Hiring IR 
 If Investor Relation (IR) firms are effective in garnering support for the management in 
activism situations as shown in the prior results, it is possible that shareholder activists could also 
hire external IR firms for similar purposes. However, in my sample, less than 5% of activism 
campaigns have a dissident, who has hired an external IR. There are two distinct reasons for it.  
First, shareholder activists consider themselves experts in knowing and providing the best 
strategic direction and advice for their target companies. So, hiring an external IR consultant 
could send out a negative signal to both the management and the other shareholders, from 
whom they are trying to get support. Such sentiments are echoed in a statement released by 
activist, Sardar Biglari of Biglari Capital Corp., regarding their target firm Cracker Barrel’s 
management, “The Board is wasting shareholders' money — lots of it — to implement its 
entrenchment strategy to resist placing a nearly 10% stockholder on the Board. … (They have also 
hired Kekst and Company for public relations and Bass, Berry & Sims as additional legal counsel.) 
We, on the other hand, do not outsource thinking; you can count on the fact that every missive 
you receive will be penned by me, not by attorneys, advisors, or consultants.” 
Second, when hedge funds hire investor relations personnel, it is not to deal with the 
target firms and its shareholders, but to help them market their own funds to their current and 
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potential clients (investors). These clients (investors) are usually high net worth individuals, 
family offices, and endowments, etc. The IR function in hedge funds is restricted to creating 
monthly updates of fund marketing materials that include trading data, risks borne and net asset 
values, and to preparing monthly and quarterly client newsletters.  
 To confirm that the results are not impacted by activists hiring IR, I re-run all the tests 
conducted in Table VII after controlling for activists with IR. The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged as presented in Table XX.  
Insert Table XX here 
 
1.3 Controlling for Stock Return and Stock Volatility 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that shareholder activism is a response to sudden stock price 
drop and stock price volatility. Therefore, in this section I repeat the main empirical tests 
presented in Table V after controlling for both stock return and stock price volatility. Table XXI 
presents the results. 
Insert Table XXI here 
 Table XXI presents the results using logistic regression analyses where the dependent 
variable is an activism campaigns’ dummy (i.e., 1 = targeted in an activism campaign and 0 = not 
targeted in an activism campaign) and the main independent variable is whether the incumbent 
management has hired an external IR firm or not. Besides the controls used in the main empirical 
tests presented in Table V, I also control for stock return and stock volatility. While stock return 
has been computed using the natural logarithm of annualized stock return adjusted by inflation, 
stock volatility is simply the annualized standard deviation of the firm stock return. All regressions 
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are clustered at firm level and run on a matched sample based on the probability of hiring an 
external IR. It can be seen that despite controlling for both stock return and stock volatility, the 
main results hold and are very similar to the results presented in Table V, both in terms of 
statistical significance and also in terms of magnitude of coefficients.  
 
2. Subsample Analysis 
Shareholder activists make their intentions to intervene a target publicly known through 
the Schedule 13D filings. The activists use the section on “Purpose of Transaction,”  i.e., Item 4 
on the Schedule 13D filings to express their intentions. Shareholder activists’ intentions vary from 
very specific demands such as dividend initiation or a board seat to more general demands such 
as shareholder value maximization. I manually read Item 4 on the Schedule 13D filings for the 
cases where ultimately there is either a management win or an activist win. I have 241 such cases. 
I further classify these cases into two groups: The first group comprises cases in which the activist 
does not have any specific demand but has a general demand of shareholder value maximization. 
I have 30 such cases in this group. The second group comprises cases in which the shareholder 
activist has a very specific demand such as a board seat or capital structure related changes. I 
find 194 such cases. There were 17 cases in which there were no demands. 
I further conduct a cross-sectional test to check if the variation in the activism outcome is 
associated with the demand type. The results are presented in Table XXII. 
Insert Table XXII here 
In all the three models I use logit regressions where the dependent variable is either 
management win or activist win. I exclude the cases that are settled between management and 
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the shareholder activist. The main independent variable is whether the targeted firm has hired 
an external IR consultant or not. The controls include lagged values of market capitalization, 
leverage, market-to-book, dividend yield and institutional ownership. While model (1) covers 
activisms with all different types of demands, models (2) and (3) look at activisms with general 
demand of “maximize shareholder value” or “more specific demands,” respectively. The results 
show that having an external IR consultant is significantly associated with management win as 
seen in model 1. However, external IR consultants are significantly more effective in helping 
management win if shareholder activist demand is general versus more specific (Model 2 vs. 
Model 3). Such results indicate that external IR firms are unable to help management win against 
more focused activists with specific demands.  
The next section discusses two specific case studies highlighting the role of IR in 
shareholder activism. 
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VII. CASE STUDIES 
 
Case 1. Trian Fund Management vs. DuPont 
Trian Fund Management, L.P., a prolific hedge fund led by a high-profile shareholder 
activist, Nelson Peltz, first invested in E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), a 213-
year-old chemical company in March, 2013 unbeknownst to DuPont’s senior management as 
Trian had not crossed the 5% ownership level.18 Ellen J. Kullman, the then CEO of DuPont, became 
aware of Trian’s investment only later on July 17th, 2013 when Nelson Peltz did an interview with 
CNBC’s Andrew Ross Sorkin.19 Trian’s large stake in DuPont was later confirmed when it filed a 
13F report on August 14th, 2013. At the time, the external IR firm advising DuPont was Kekst and 
Company.20 Kekst arranged several one-to-one meetings of DuPont’s management with Trian, 
where Trian laid out its demands including its demand to put its four nominees on DuPont’s board 
with an intention to split the company to maximize shareholders’ value.21  
After several months of unsuccessful private negotiations, a public battle ensued, 
culminating with a proxy fight on May 13th, 2015 at DuPont’s annual shareholder meeting. Prior 
to the proxy fight, Trian owned 2.7% (24.4 million shares) of DuPont.22 Three influential proxy 
advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), Glass, Lewis & Co. and Egan-Jones 
Proxy Services even advised the shareholders to vote for Nelson Peltz as one of the board 
members. The share price of DuPont rose by 5% on the announcement by ISS supporting Nelson 
                                                          
18 Trian’s Letter to DuPont Stockholders, dated February 11th, 2015. 
19 http://www.cnbc.com/id/100893349 
20 Kekst’s team supporting DuPont included Lissa Perlman (Senior VP), Andrea Calise (Managing Director), Lyndsey 
Estin (Managing Director), Kathleen Deveny (Managing Director), Jim David (Managing Director) and Anntal Silver 
(Principal).   
21 Trian’s nominees were Nelson Peltz, John H. Myers, Arthur B. Winkleblack and Robert J. Zatta. 
22 Press release by Trian Fund Management, L.P., dated January 8th, 2015. 
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Peltz, indicating that the market participants were siding with Trian’s demands as well. Proxy 
advisory firms’ advice to other shareholders in such contested fights is regarded as crucial.23 
Another large institutional owner of DuPont, California State Teachers Retirement System 
(CalSTRS), announced their support for Trian. DuPont did not have a staggered board and the 
entire slate of their directors could be elected annually. To cope with the situation and to 
convince the other large shareholders to support the incumbent management, DuPont’s CEO 
Kullman hired two new IR firms, Joele Frank Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher and CamberView 
Partners.24 These IR firms specialize in activist defense tactics and they advised and assisted 
DuPont in persuading other key shareholders such as BlackRock, Inc. and The Vanguard Group, 
Inc. to side with management.25 
On May 13th, 2015 despite all the validation from three key proxy advisory firms, the 
public announcement of support from CalSTRS, the market’s favorable reaction, and absence of 
a staggered board, Trian lost the proxy fight for all four of their nominees including Nelson Peltz 
himself, and CEO Ellen Kullman received a standing ovation from the shareholders when she 
thanked them for their support at the closing of the annual meeting. This case study indicates 
that external IR firms are probably playing a key role in assisting management to maneuver such 
proxy battles. Another point to note here is that DuPont, which is one of the largest companies 
in the world and the fourth oldest company in Fortune 500, does not need enhanced visibility or 
                                                          
23 Malenko and Shen (2016) also document the certification role played by Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. 
(ISS), one of the main proxy advisory firms, in a regression discontinuity design set up. 
24 IR firm Joele Frank’s effort for DuPont’s defense was led by Joele Frank (Managing Partner), Jamie Moser (Partner), 
Andrea Rose (Partner), Sharon Stern (Partner), Aaron Palash (Managing Director) and Adam Pollack (Director). IR 
firm CamberView Partners’ team was led by Abe M. Friedman (Founder and Chief Executive Officer of CamberView 
Partners). 
25 According to the company definitive proxy statement (DEFC14A) dated March 23rd, 2015 BlackRock, Inc. and The 
Vanguard Group, Inc. had a stake of 6.30% and 5.53% respectively in DuPont. 
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liquidity but still hired multiple outside IR firms which suggests that IR firms are potentially 
playing a greater role than just improving visibility and liquidity. I argue that IR firms are getting 
more specialized in providing services such as coping with shareholder activist situations as this 
case indicates. How are these IR firms helping the target firms to be successful against activists? 
Abe Friedman from CamberView Partners, who was one of the external IR firms hired by DuPont, 
sums it up nicely, “If you can frame the activist agenda as a short-term plan and yours as a long-
term one, that’s persuasive. The governance folks are “buy and hold.” BlackRock, for example, 
manages something like $3 trillion of indexed funds. They’re going to be in these stocks for 50 or 
100 years. They want good, long-term, sustainable performance.”26 
 
Case 2. Biglari Holdings vs. Cracker Barrel 
Biglari Capital Corp., a Texas based activist hedge fund that specializes in targeting 
restaurant chains, has waged activism campaigns targeted at Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, 
Inc., (Cracker Barrel), a forty-year-old restaurant and country store chain, six times during the 
period 2011-2015.27 Biglari Capital Corp., headed by Sardar Biglari, a prolific activist hedge fund 
manager, held 9.9% (2,287,987 shares) of the shares outstanding before the first proxy fight, held 
on 20th, December, 2011.28 The other big shareholders at that point of time were BlackRock 
Advisors, LLC and the Vanguard Group, Inc., who owned a stake of 9.83% (2,252,067 shares) and 
                                                          
26 https://www.brunswickgroup.com/media/608659/Brunswick-Review-spotlight-on-shareholder-activism.pdf 
27 Announcement dates of the six activism campaigns: 13th, June, 2011; 19th, April, 2012; 15th February, 2013; 17th, 
September, 2013; 18th, December, 2013; 23rd, October, 2015. 
28 As per the 13D/A filed by Biglari Capital Corp. on 21st, October, 2011. 
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5.65% (1,294,714 shares) respectively in Cracker Barrel, besides the directors and officers of 
Cracker Barrel, who owned a 5% (1,166,870 shares) interest in the company.29 
Sardar Biglari expressed disappointment with Cracker Barrel’s financial performance and 
demanded a board seat to appoint himself on the board. The management of Cracker Barrel was 
taken aback to know about Biglari’s intentions and his significant 10% ownership stake from the 
schedule 13D filing that was filed on 13th, June, 2011. Cracker Barrel did not have a staggered 
board and there was no poison pill in force to face a sudden challenge from such a prolific and 
specialized hedge fund activist. Glass Lewis, a prominent and independent proxy advisor also 
recommended Cracker Barrel’s shareholders to vote in support of Sardar Biglari’s nomination to 
the board. Cracker Barrel’s management hired a top ranked, New York based external IR firm, 
Makovsky Integrated Communications, to deal with the situation in 2011.30,31 They also hired 
Ruth Pachman from Kekst and Company to be their main media contact.32 
It is interesting to note that Sardar Biglari in a press release dated September 13th, 2011 
said, “The approach the Cracker Barrel Board has taken in resisting us and the length to which it 
has gone do not display its sophistication but rather, in our view, a lack of good business 
judgment. The Board is wasting shareholders' money — lots of it — to implement its 
entrenchment strategy to resist placing a nearly 10% stockholder on the Board. …….(They have 
also hired Kekst and Company for public relations and Bass, Berry & Sims as additional legal 
                                                          
29 According to Cracker Barrel’s definitive proxy statement. 
30 Although the exact date of Cracker Barrel’s management hiring Makovsky Integrated Communications is not 
available, multiple news searches from Factiva and LexisNexis indicate that Cracker Barrel hired Makovsky in 2011. 
31 http://www.makovsky.com/services/ 
32http://www.kekst.com/our-practice-areas/#areas-sacg  
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counsel.) We, on the other hand, do not outsource thinking; you can count on the fact that every 
missive you receive will be penned by me, not by attorneys, advisors, or consultants.” 
Cracker Barrel’s management, led by Mike Woodhouse, responded to Biglari’s campaign 
with several corporate governance changes of their own, such as adding two new board seats 
and promoting the CFO, Sandra Cochran, to the position of CEO. Two other long-time board 
members of Cracker Barrel declared that they would not seek re-election. The incumbent 
management not only claimed that the governance changes were a part of a succession plan and 
not a response to Biglari’s intervention, but they also declined to invite Sardar Biglari to be on 
the board, citing that he was the CEO of Steak n Shake, a competitor, and putting Biglari on the 
board would expose their business plans to a competitor. In a Schedule 14A filing that was filed 
on September 2nd, 2011, with the SEC, Cracker Barrel responded to Biglari’s announced intentions 
to commence a proxy fight by stating, “Appointing the chief executive officer of a competing 
restaurant chain, Steak n Shake, to the Cracker Barrel Board would create serious and 
inappropriate business conflicts of interest.  The Board has never in Cracker Barrel’s 42-year 
history included a director who was a director or officer of another restaurant company, and such 
appointments would violate the Company’s Corporate Governance Guidelines. Including a 
director of a competitor on the Cracker Barrel Board would violate the federal antitrust laws.” 
Cracker Barrel started issuing more press releases and persuading the other large 
shareholders behind the scenes.33 Finally, despite nearly 10% shareholdings and support from 
                                                          
33 Although behind the scene one-to-one meetings with other large shareholders is not observable to the empiricist, 
I find that after the hiring of two external IR firms, Cracker Barrel issued significantly more, 145 (132 articles with 
positive tone) press releases in 2012 as compared to 101 (54 articles with positive tone) company generated press 
releases in 2010. 
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Glass Lewis, Sardar Biglari was unsuccessful in securing a board seat in the proxy fight on 20th, 
December 2011 and the incumbent management won. But Biglari Capital Corp. was persistent 
and tried five more times, initiating activism campaigns, three of which again reached the proxy 
fight stage.34 However, Sardar Biglari lost again in all these fights.    
  
                                                          
34 The meeting dates of these three other proxy fights were: 15th, November 2012; 13th, November, 2013 and most 
recently, 23rd, April, 2014. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Although the literature on investor relations is still in its nascent stage, academics have 
identified several different roles played by investor relations in creating economic value for their 
clients such as enhancing visibility and liquidity (Bushee and Miller, 2012), ‘spinning’ their clients’ 
news to influence investor beliefs (Solomon, 2012) and attracting greater analyst following, and 
engaging with institutional investors through increased one-to-one interactions (Karolyi and Liao, 
2017). Combining novel hand-collected data on IR firms, shareholder activism campaigns data 
extracted 13D and proxy statements, and textual analysis of company-generated news, I argue 
that one key IR function which has been overlooked in the extant literature, but is equally 
important if not more, is their ability to help the management cope with rising shareholder 
activism. With the advent of improved and faster technologies such as the internet, social media, 
fully automated stock exchanges and electronic and high-frequency trading and better 
transparency over the past fifteen years, there is a lesser need for enhanced visibility or liquidity. 
IR firms have evolved, and have gone beyond providing publicity to providing more specialized 
and sophisticated services such as enabling their client firms’ management effectively manage 
shareholder activism.   
I document that corporations that have hired external IR consultants experience fewer 
activism campaigns, have a higher likelihood of management winning against the activist, and 
have a higher likelihood of mutual funds voting with management. I provide evidence on two 
possible channels through which IR firms are assisting management in coping with shareholder 
activism. First, I find that firms with external IR have a significantly higher number of institutional 
75 
 
owners, but lower institutional ownership, as compared with a matched sample of firms having 
no external IR. Such a negative influence on institutional ownership seems to be driven by lower 
active institutional ownership in firms with external IR. I also find evidence that suggests that 
external IR firms assist their clients in attracting more passive institutional investors as compared 
to active institutional investors. One possible way the IR firms and their clients target key 
institutional investors is through selective one-to-one interactions by organizing and participating 
in investor/analyst days and broker-hosted conferences. Second, I report that external IR 
consultants enable almost 27% more PR media coverage, and significantly fewer negative 
sentiments for their clients as compared to matched firms without external IRs. Finally, the event 
study results suggest that the market perceives firms’ use of external IR consultants as increasing 
managerial entrenchment instead of shareholder value enhancement.   
Based on the theoretical literature, as well as the empirical and anecdotal evidence 
presented in this article, I believe IR firms are playing a critical role in coping with shareholder 
activism by continuously monitoring and communicating both privately and publicly not only with 
the activists but also with other shareholders to contend with their shifting opinions. Such results 
are not only important for investor relations and shareholder activism literature in finance but 
also improves our understanding of the role played by media in corporate finance.  
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Variable Definition 
Targeted by Activism Dummy variable equal to one if a firm is targeted by activism during 
the year, zero otherwise.  
No. of Campaigns The number of times that a firm is targeted by activism post hiring 
an external Investor Relation consultant.  
Activism Outcome The outcome of an activism campaign: management win, 
settlement, or activist win.  
Mutual Funds Support Dummy variable equal to one if majority of mutual funds vote with 
the management on a certain proposal, zero otherwise.  
Investor Day Dummy variable equal to one if a firm has hosted at least one 
Investor Day event during the year, zero otherwise. 
Investor Conference Dummy variable equal to one if a firm has attended at least one 
Investor Conference event during the year, zero otherwise. 
PX14A6G Filings Dummy variable equal to one if a firm has filed at least one 
PX14A6G report with SEC during the year, zero otherwise.  
Institutional Ownership The percentage of shares held by institutional investors.  
Active Institutional 
Ownership 
The percentage of shares held by active institutional investors, 
where active institutional investors are classified following Bushee 
(2001) and Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016).  
Passive Institutional 
Ownership 
The percentage of shares held by passive institutional investors, 
where passive institutional investors are classified following Bushee 
(2001) and Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016). 
No. of Institutional 
Owners 
The number of institutional investors.  
 
No. of Active 
Institutional Owners 
The number of active institutional investors, where active 
institutional investors are classified following Bushee (2001) and 
Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016). 
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Variable Definition 
No. of Passive 
Institutional Owners 
The number of passive institutional investors, where passive 
institutional investors are classified following Bushee (2001) and 
Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016). 
News Coverage Natural logarithm of one plus the number of news articles (press 
releases).  
Negative Tone (Number of Negative Words) – (Number of Positive Words) / Total 
Number of Words 
IR Dummy Dummy variable equal to one if a firm has at least one external 
Investor Relation Consultant during the year, zero otherwise. 
Size in Market Value Natural logarithm of the market capitalization.   
Size in Total Assets Natural logarithm of the total assets.  
Market to Book (Book Value of Debt + Market Value of Equity) / (Book Value of Debt 
+ Book Value of Equity) 
Sales Growth The growth rate of sales from year t-1 to year t.  
Return on Assets (ROA) EBITDA divided by lagged total assets.  
Leverage Book Value of Debt / (Book Value of Debt + Book Value of Equity) 
Dividend Yield (Common Dividend) / (Market Value of Common Equity) 
R&D Research and Development expenses divided by lagged assets 
No. of Analyst Following The number of analyst following the company 
Liquidity Liquidity measure following Amihud (2002) 
External Financing (Operating Cash Flow – Capital Expenditures) / Capital Expenditure 
Executive Ownership The percentage of shares held by executives. 
Stock Volatility Annualized standard deviation of the firm stock return. 
Stock Return Natural logarithm of annualized stock return adjusted by inflation 
E-Index Entrenchment Index 
 
Note: Lagged variables included in some of the models in the paper are lagged by one year.  
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Table I Summary Statistics of Firms using IR 
Firms that have hired external IR during the twelve-year sample period between 2003 and 2014 are identified using O’Dwyer’s PR Firm’s Annual 
Directories. 2,336 different public firms use one or more unique 422 external IR firms at some point during the sample period. Panel A shows the 
number of firms that use external IR each year and the percentage of Compustat population represented by these IR firms every year in terms of 
market capitalization. Firm Size (total assets, AT) in Panel B and Market Capitalization (MKVALT) in Panel C are from Compustat (adjusted for 
inflation). In Panel D, the sample of public firms in the U.S. that use external IR has been divided into Small Cap (market capitalization < $ 2B), Mid 
Cap (market capitalization between $ 2B and $10B) and Large Cap (market capitalization > $ 10B). 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B Panel C Panel D
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap
2003 158 939 45.27% 36.21 2.21 130.14 14.34 1.67 34.37 52.24% 20.35% 27.40%
2004 155 918 45.23% 35.53 2.17 127.68 14.07 1.64 33.72 49.51% 20.75% 29.74%
2005 142 864 42.43% 34.50 2.11 124.00 13.66 1.59 32.75 48.95% 19.82% 31.23%
2006 156 713 36.37% 33.18 2.02 119.25 13.14 1.53 31.49 44.53% 20.45% 35.02%
2007 177 802 37.89% 32.50 1.98 116.82 12.87 1.50 30.85 42.64% 21.79% 35.57%
2008 184 775 42.78% 31.17 1.90 112.03 12.34 1.44 29.59 50.29% 20.74% 28.96%
2009 163 692 35.81% 31.16 1.90 111.99 12.34 1.44 29.58 46.33% 19.82% 33.85%
2010 148 673 32.74% 30.36 1.85 109.13 12.02 1.40 28.82 44.29% 18.88% 36.83%
2011 124 577 27.73% 29.88 1.82 107.37 11.83 1.38 28.36 44.68% 23.14% 32.18%
2012 115 583 30.75% 29.03 1.77 104.32 11.50 1.34 27.55 40.10% 22.37% 37.53%
2013 96 518 30.30% 28.57 1.74 102.69 11.31 1.32 27.12 26.61% 26.32% 47.08%
2014 91 454 28.71% 28.13 1.72 101.09 11.14 1.30 26.70 23.78% 26.57% 49.65%
Composition# of Compustat Firms 
using External IR
% of Compustat Population 
Represented in terms of Mkt. Cap.
Year # of External 
IR Firms
Panel A
Firm Size (AT), in $ billions Mkt. Cap. (MKVALT), in $ billions
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Table II Summary Statistics of External IR Consultants 
The table summarizes the number of external IR firms (column 2) and the number of Compustat 
companies hiring external IR firms (column 3) in my sample for each year from 2003 to 2014. Column 4 
shows the average number of publicly listed clients per each IR firm. Column 5 and Column 6 list the total 
fees generated by the top-20 IR firms based on the prior year fees and the average amount spend per 
year by a client on hiring a top-20 IR respectively. The last column is the number of clients using top-20 IR 
firms during my sample period. Please note, fees shown are generated through their IR services only, and 
do not include other professional services provided by them. Also, companies might be hiring multiple IR 
firms in one year.    
 
 
 
 
 
2003 158 939 5.94 90.90 369,515 246
2004 155 918 5.92 103.64 433,642 239
2005 142 864 6.08 107.63 484,816 222
2006 156 713 4.57 147.03 706,876 208
2007 177 802 4.53 162.36 715,226 227
2008 184 775 4.21 152.04 707,146 215
2009 163 692 4.25 85.15 465,296 183
2010 148 673 4.55 105.58 685,569 154
2011 124 577 4.65 134.81 832,186 162
2012 115 583 5.07 141.66 814,141 174
2013 96 518 5.40 165.24 983,548 168
2014 91 454 4.99 184.80 1,232,024 150
# of clients 
using top-20 
IR Firms
Year # of External IR Firms
# of Compustat 
Firms using 
External IR
Average # of 
Publicly Listed 
Clients per IR 
Total Fees generated 
by the Top-20 IR Firms 
($ million) per year
Average amount spent 
per year by a client on 
hiring a top-20 IR Firm 
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Table III Summary Statistics of Activism Campaigns 
This table gives the summary statistics of the activism campaign data during 2003-2014 for firms without external IR (Panel A) and firms with 
external IR (Panel B) that were targeted during this period. All the public activism campaigns are further classified into exempt solicitations, 
stockholder campaigns and proxy fights. The number of campaigns and the percentage of total for each campaign type are shown below.     
 
 
 
 
Year Total # of Activism Campaigns
Exempt 
Solicitation
% of 
Total
Other Stockholder 
Campaign % of Total
Proxy 
Fight % of Total
Total # of Activism 
Campaigns
Exempt 
Solicitation
% of 
Total
Other Stockholder 
Campaign % of Total
Proxy 
Fight % of Total
2003 96 1 1.04% 40 41.67% 55 57.29% 17 0 0.00% 4 23.53% 13 76.47%
2004 85 2 2.35% 47 55.29% 36 42.35% 25 2 8.00% 17 68.00% 6 24.00%
2005 169 7 4.14% 96 56.80% 66 39.05% 80 17 21.25% 45 56.25% 18 22.50%
2006 353 9 2.55% 245 69.41% 99 28.05% 90 6 6.67% 63 70.00% 21 23.33%
2007 378 11 2.91% 281 74.34% 86 22.75% 133 14 10.53% 98 73.68% 21 15.79%
2008 360 9 2.50% 254 70.56% 97 26.94% 139 10 7.19% 100 71.94% 29 20.86%
2009 277 14 5.05% 175 63.18% 88 31.77% 96 10 10.42% 62 64.58% 24 25.00%
2010 274 10 3.65% 196 71.53% 68 24.82% 90 12 13.33% 50 55.56% 28 31.11%
2011 252 11 4.37% 175 69.44% 66 26.19% 111 16 14.41% 67 60.36% 28 25.23%
2012 258 22 8.53% 188 72.87% 48 18.60% 125 30 24.00% 71 56.80% 24 19.20%
2013 282 21 7.45% 179 63.48% 78 27.66% 105 36 34.29% 51 48.57% 22 20.95%
2014 330 14 4.24% 250 75.76% 66 20.00% 126 27 21.43% 71 56.35% 28 22.22%
Panel A: Firms without External IR Panel B: Firms with External IR
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Table IV-a Descriptive Statistics of Firms with and without External IR Consultants 
Table IV compares the descriptive statistics of the various accounting, institutional ownership, analyst following, and executive ownership 
characteristics of the firms that do not use external IR (Panel A) versus the firms that do use external IR (Panel B). All variables cover data from 
2003 to 2014, except the active ownership data which covers from 2003 to 2013. All firm-level variables are winsorized at the 1% level in both tails 
of the distribution. The last column reports the p-value from t tests.  
 
 
 
Variable n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. p-value
Total Assets ($ million) 103,840 3,574.5 234.5 13,113.0 0.0 106,685.0 6,393 55,778.3 3,582.5 201,650.6 4.0 1,527,015.0 < 0.0000
CAPEX ($ million) 101,500 114.1 3.5 400.4 0.0 2,956.0 6,321 816.7 81.0 2,141.6 0.0 14,563.0 < 0.0000
Sales ($ million) 103,168 1,526.1 95.9 4,779.1 0.0 34,733.9 6,393 15,275.0 2,683.0 30,847.3 0.0 180,929.0 < 0.0000
Operating Cash Flow ($ million) 101,796 207.9 7.7 714.6 -156.1 5,276.3 6,338 2,125.7 249.8795 5,263.8 -6,086.0 31,696.0 < 0.0000
Long-Term Debt ($ million) 103,619 695.9 7.7 2,335.6 0.0 17,410.5 6,367 7,864.6 619.124 26,681.1 0.0 201,087.0 0.2764
External Financing 90,753 11.276 -0.239 75.009 -149.185 553.500 6,064 -0.247 -1.352 21.600 -62.980 152.123 < 0.0000
Leverage 85,008 0.490 0.054 1.388 0.000 10.524 5,588 0.508 0.149 1.231 0.000 9.148 < 0.0000
R&D/Total Assets 44,748 0.163 0.038 0.373 0.000 2.652 3,738 0.071 0.034 0.107 0.000 0.677 < 0.0000
No. of Block Owners (> 5%) 67,611 1.48 1.00 1.62 0.00 6.00 5,216 1.86 2.00 1.70 0.00 7.00 < 0.0000
No. of Institutional Owners (13F) 67,611 80.00 39.00 106.49 1.00 579.00 5,216 291.46 174.00 320.14 1.00 1,491.00 < 0.0000
Ownership Concentration (HHI) 67,611 27.67% 13.46% 30.88% 2.43% 100.00% 5,216 11.55% 5.08% 18.02% 1.93% 100.00% < 0.0000
Institutional Ownership (% of S/O) 67,519 37.83% 30.71% 33.01% 0.00% 100.00% 5,213 57.42% 65.37% 31.38% 0.02% 100.00% < 0.0000
No. of Active Institutional Owners (13F) 61,778 43.41 20.00 53.33 0.00 249.00 4,918 124.18 100.00 104.10 0.00 468.00 < 0.0000
Active Ownership Concentration (HHI) 61,778 1.00% 0.22% 2.40% 0.00% 18.64% 4,918 0.88% 0.44% 1.24% 0.00% 6.95% < 0.0000
Active Institutional Ownership (% of S/O) 56,657 18.33% 12.94% 18.67% 0.00% 79.34% 4,550 24.34% 22.66% 17.49% 0.00% 74.39% < 0.0000
No. of Analysts 38,807 8.65 6.00 7.78 1.00 36.00 4,731 14.66 12.00 10.80 1.00 44.00 < 0.0000
Executive Ownership 16,462 3.19% 0.98% 6.33% 0.00% 37.60% 3,130 1.76% 1.35% 4.35% 0.00% 27.25% < 0.0000
Executive Ownership (excluding options) 16,462 3.23% 0.75% 6.72% 0.00% 38.28% 3,130 1.91% 0.21% 5.00% 0.00% 31.70% < 0.0000
Panel B: Firms with external IRPanel A: Firms without External IR
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Table IV-b Descriptive Statistics of Firms with and without External IR Consultants (matched control sample) 
Table compares the descriptive statistics of the various accounting, institutional ownership, and governance (E-Index) characteristics of the firms 
that do not use external IR versus the firms that do use external IR post-matching. All variables cover data from 2003 to 2014. The last column 
reports the t-statistics for the differences in means.  
 
 
Matched Firms 
without External IR Firms with External IR
Mean Mean Mean t-value
Size (Market Value) 10,070.660 11,724.730 -1,654.072 -1.832
Market to Book 3.062 2.664 0.398 0.722
Sales Growth 0.242 0.163 0.080 1.234
ROA 0.127 0.169 -0.043 -0.901
Leverage 0.369 0.357 0.012 0.819
Dividend Yield 0.016 0.018 -0.002 -1.318
R&D/TA 0.037 0.041 -0.004 -1.542
Institutional Ownership 0.684 0.636 0.049 1.022
E-Index 2.824 2.857 -0.033 -0.616
Difference
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Table V Probability of being Targeted by Activists and the Use of External IR Consultants 
This table reports the results using logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable is a 
campaigns dummy (i.e., 1 = targeted in an activism campaign and 0 = not targeted in an activism campaign) 
and the main independent variable is whether the incumbent management has hired an external IR firm 
or not. All the models have industry and year fixed effects and have been clustered at the firm level. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy (Targeted 
within sample period 
After IR is Hired)
Dummy (Targeted 
within 3 years After 
IR is Hired)
Dummy (Targeted 
within 2 year After IR 
is Hired)
Dummy (Targeted 
within 1 year After IR 
is Hired)
IR_Dummy -0.155** -0.137** -0.109* -0.103
(-2.44) (-2.10) (-1.65) (-1.49)
lag_Size -0.064** -0.094*** -0.098*** -0.093***
(-2.47) (-3.62) (-3.61) (-3.31)
lag_M/B -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016** -0.026***
(-2.75) (-2.61) (-2.56) (-3.14)
lag_Sales Growth -0.054 -0.094** -0.095* -0.140**
(-1.60) (-1.99) (-1.79) (-2.25)
lag_ROA -0.132 -0.156 -0.228 -0.329*
(-0.79) (-0.91) (-1.32) (-1.69)
lag_Leverage 0.121** 0.119** 0.122** 0.112**
(2.37) (2.39) (2.39) (2.33)
lag_Dividend Yield -0.794 -1.678* -2.737** -1.979*
(-1.29) (-1.67) (-2.00) (-1.65)
lag_R&D/TA -0.131 -0.270 -0.385 -0.431
(-0.40) (-0.78) (-1.08) (-1.10)
lag_Institutional Ownership 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.006
(0.68) (0.62) (0.53) (0.55)
lag_No. of Analyst 0.173*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.170***
(4.22) (3.70) (3.53) (3.89)
lag_liquidity 0.011 0.046 0.008 0.057
(0.09) (0.39) (0.05) (0.36)
Constant 0.802 -0.027 -0.209 -0.523
(1.22) (-0.03) (-0.24) (-0.62)
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
N 5400 4844 4627 4391
pseudo R-sq 0.102 0.100 0.097 0.100
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Table VI Number of Activism Campaigns and the Use of External IR Consultants 
Model 1 of the table is an OLS model with the number of activism campaign as the dependent variable 
and the IR dummy as the main variable of interest on the right hand side. Model 1 controls for the industry 
fixed effects and model 2 is the same specification but also controls for the year fixed effects. In model 3 
and 4, I use Poisson Model to re-estimate the regressions, where the signs and significance levels of the 
coefficients of IR dummy stay the same. Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.010).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
No. of Campaigns No. of Campaigns No. of Campaigns No. of Campaigns
IR_Dummy -0.128** -0.123** -0.104** -0.100**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.052) (0.049)
lag_Log (Total Assets) 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
lag_Sales Growth -0.012** -0.011** -0.011* -0.011**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
lag_No. of Analyst 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.115 -0.106 -0.093 -0.087
(0.102) (0.111) (0.072) (0.078)
lag_Leverage -0.020 -0.018 -0.017 -0.014
(0.037) (0.037) (0.025) (0.025)
lag_M/B 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
lag_Dividend Yield -0.344* -0.379* -0.300* -0.333**
(0.205) (0.210) (0.164) (0.167)
Constant 1.112*** 1.014*** 0.094 0.012
(0.082) (0.138) (0.065) (0.104)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y N Y
N 906 906 906 906
pseudo R-sq 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.011
93 
 
Table VII Activism Campaign Outcomes and the Use of External IR Consultants 
The results in this table use ordered logit model where the dependent variable is management win, settlement, or activist win. The main 
independent variable is whether the targeted firm has hired an external IR consultant or not. I further categorize all the dissidents each year into 
the most prolific activists and less prolific based on the number of campaigns they initiated in the prior year. I include the top fifty such activists in 
the most prolific list and the rest as non-prolific activists. Panel A are the results from all campaigns, and Panel B are the results from campaigns 
run by the less prolific activists. Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation
IR_Dummy 0.492 0.485 0.390 0.867** 0.995*** 0.819** 0.149 -0.545 0.149
(0.309) (0.340) (0.306) (0.355) (0.382) (0.400) (0.500) (0.734) (0.500)
lag_Log (MV) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.103 -0.220 -0.351 0.071 -0.100 -0.288 -0.003 -0.140 -0.003
(0.438) (0.489) (0.453) (0.513) (0.578) (0.559) (0.850) (1.038) (0.850)
lag_Leverage 0.671** 0.779** 0.543* 0.520 0.693 0.508 0.279 0.375 0.279
(0.298) (0.377) (0.320) (0.349) (0.447) (0.384) (0.760) (1.082) (0.760)
lag_M/B -0.144** -0.131 -0.113 -0.134 -0.200 -0.030 -0.058 0.334 -0.058
(0.072) (0.124) (0.077) (0.137) (0.140) (0.141) (0.180) (0.338) (0.180)
lag_Dividend Yield 0.431 0.460 0.346 0.308 0.371 0.267 30.918* 22.095 30.918*
(0.336) (0.343) (0.297) (0.284) (0.293) (0.280) (17.509) (24.415) (17.509)
cut1
Constant -2.150** -1.793 -2.316** -1.857** -1.195*** -1.972** -2.195 -1.329 -2.195
(1.053) (1.181) (1.080) (0.868) (0.375) (0.959) (2.102) (2.268) (2.102)
cut2
Constant -0.495 -0.190 -0.595 -0.330 0.343 -0.388 0.023 0.932 0.023
(1.055) (1.184) (1.079) (0.890) (0.395) (0.980) (2.077) (2.294) (2.077)
N 350 252 290 254 199 194 96 53 96
pseudo R-sq 0.065 0.101 0.043 0.092 0.146 0.066 0.063 0.082 0.063
Panel A: All Activists Panel B: Non-Prolific Activists Panel C: Prolific Activists
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Table VIII Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volume around Activism Announcements 
Table shows the mean cumulative abnormal trading volume (CATVs) around the announcement of activism campaigns for six different event 
windows. Panel A presents results on activism campaigns led by prolific activists (with vs. without external IR). Panel B presents results on activism 
campaigns led by non-prolific activists (with vs. without external IR). The last column reports the p-value by comparing the CATVs of two firm 
groups (with vs. without external IR) in both scenarios. I compute the abnormal trading volume as the difference between the actual log-
transformed volume and the expected market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) log-transformed volume over the windows indicated in the 
first column. Market model has been estimated using 60 days of daily trading volumes ending 40 days prior to the announcement date. I also 
report both the Patell Z-statistic and the corresponding p-value. 
 
 
Differences
Windows Mean CATV Patell Z p-value Mean CATV Patell Z p-value p-value
(0, 1) 111.80% 48.604 <.0001 110.26% 17.764 <.0001 0.9349
(-1,+1) 151.51% 52.521 <.0001 152.87% 19.739 <.0001 0.9611
(-2, 2) 220.03% 58.717 <.0001 205.73% 20.662 <.0001 0.7397
(-5, +5) 405.11% 71.419 <.0001 258.96% 19.317 <.0001 0.0820
(-10,+10) 667.09% 84.082 <.0001 373.73% 20.067 <.0001 0.0455
(-20, +20) 927.01% 86.479 <.0001 427.59% 17.218 <.0001 0.0427
Differences
Windows Mean CATV Patell Z p-value Mean CATV Patell Z p-value p-value
(0, 1) 110.84% 52.229 <.0001 55.32% 15.012 <.0001 0.0001
(-1,+1) 133.04% 51.374 <.0001 58.85% 14.216 <.0001 0.0001
(-2, 2) 192.62% 56.141 <.0001 81.47% 15.202 <.0001 0.0001
(-5, +5) 317.01% 61.585 <.0001 142.25% 17.176 <.0001 0.0013
(-10,+10) 486.12% 65.861 <.0001 207.42% 17.523 <.0001 0.0025
(-20, +20) 684.07% 63.949 <.0001 228.48% 16.808 <.0001 0.0042
Panel B: Activism by Non-Prolific Activists 
Firms without external IR Firms with external IR
Panel A: Activism by Prolific Activists 
Firms without external IR Firms with external IR
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Table IX Mutual Funds Voting Results 
The table uses logit regressions on matched sample. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
indicating whether mutual funds vote with the management on a certain proposal. In Model 1, I include 
all different types of proposals. In Model 2, I only include proposals on electing directors. Standard errors 
are in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
All Proposals Proposals on Electing Directors
Vote with management Vote with management
IR_Dummy 0.309*** 1.442***
(0.114) (0.413)
Size (Market Value) -0.049* 0.381*
(0.028) (0.204)
Market-to-Book -0.050 -0.089
(0.040) (0.124)
Sales Growth 0.016 -0.515
(0.153) (0.390)
ROA -0.006 3.112
(0.614) (2.170)
Leverage 0.229 2.647***
(0.167) (0.876)
Dividend Yield 0.872 -3.574
(2.147) (9.127)
R&D 5.613*** 10.142
(1.570) (6.898)
Institutional Ownership -0.026 3.291**
(0.305) (1.432)
Liquidity -0.034 70.575**
(0.304) (29.527)
Constant 2.287** -3.793
(1.123) (3.065)
N 4867 2517
pseudo R-sq 0.029 0.135
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Table X Investor Day, Investor Conference, and PX14A6G Filings 
The table uses logit regressions on matched sample. In Model 1, the dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating whether a firm has hosted at least one Investor Day Event during that year. In Model 2, the 
dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a firm has attended at least one Investor Conference 
Event during that year. In Model 3, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a firm has filed 
at least one PX14A6G report with SEC during that year. And t-statistics in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.010). All regressions are clustered at firm (gvkey) level.  
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
DV: Investor Day DV: Investor Conference DV: PX14A6G Filings
IR_Dummy 0.240** 0.419** 0.534*
(2.03) (2.43) (1.94)
Size (Market Value) 0.031 0.195*** 0.892***
(0.62) (3.99) (9.32)
Market-to-Book 0.001 -0.016 -0.001
(1.06) (-0.75) (-0.04)
Sales Growth -0.094 0.354* -0.417
(-1.40) (1.74) (-1.24)
ROA -0.123 -0.788 0.618
(-0.42) (-1.00) (1.02)
Leverage 0.046 -0.009 -0.128
(0.79) (-0.05) (-0.39)
Dividend Yield -0.672 -2.619** -30.135***
(-0.48) (-2.12) (-3.06)
R&D 0.406 1.706 -1.403
(0.73) (0.78) (-0.56)
Institutional Ownership -0.036 0.034 0.061
(-0.22) (1.27) (0.96)
Liquidity -0.458 -0.154 -4.120
(-0.47) (-0.92) (-0.72)
No. of Analyst Following 0.551*** 0.875***
(5.30) (8.51)
Constant -2.451** -2.946*** -13.620***
(-2.13) (-4.27) (-9.56)
Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Clustering Y Y Y
N 4958 3081 6727
pseudo R-sq 0.133 0.623 0.293
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Table XI Institutional Ownership and the Use of External IR Consultants 
The table uses OLS regressions. In model 1 the dependent variable is institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares outstanding.  Model 
2 has active institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding) as the dependent variable. In model 3, the dependent variable is 
passive institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding). In model 4, the dependent variable is the number of institutional owners. 
Model 5 and model 6 have the number of active institutional owners and the number of passive institutional owners respectively as dependent 
variables. Standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010). All regressions are clustered at firm (gvkey) level.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Institutional 
Ownership (%)
Active Institutional 
Ownership (%)
Passive Institutional 
Ownership (%)
Number of 
Institutional Owners
Number of Active 
Institutional Owners
Number of Passive 
Institutional Owners
IR Dummy -0.017** -0.017** -0.011 29.633*** 3.331* 26.302***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (7.024) (1.946) (6.711)
Sales Growth 0.007 0.035*** -0.037*** 36.700* 10.029*** 26.671
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (19.941) (2.989) (18.136)
External Financing -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.011 -0.001 -0.010**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
Log (Total Assets) 0.000 -0.015*** 0.000 119.245*** 13.537*** 105.708***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (4.812) (0.853) (4.642)
Leverage -0.008*** -0.000 -0.004*** -5.515 -0.692 -4.823
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (4.139) (0.465) (3.691)
R&D/Total Assets -0.051*** -0.016*** -0.039*** 65.462*** 6.653*** 58.809***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (17.883) (2.018) (16.038)
Executive Ownership -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.471 -0.168* -0.303
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.479) (0.089) (0.457)
M/B 0.003 0.001 -0.001 10.072** 0.999 9.073**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (4.918) (0.737) (4.245)
Constant 0.813*** 0.462*** 0.586*** -764.762*** -57.853* -706.909***
(0.073) (0.044) (0.050) (114.185) (29.528) (89.495)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3073 2881 2881 3073 3073 3073
adj. R2 0.210 0.162 0.152 0.673 0.157 0.622
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Table XII Institutional Ownership and the Use of External IR Consultants 
Difference-in-Differences Framework 
The table presents results using difference-in-differences set-up. In model 1 the dependent variable is institutional ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding.  Model 2 has active institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding) as the dependent variable. In model 
3, the dependent variable is passive institutional ownership (as a percentage of shares outstanding). In model 4, the dependent variable is the 
number of institutional owners. Model 5 and model 6 have the number of active institutional owners and the number of passive institutional 
owners respectively as dependent variables. Standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010). All regressions are clustered at 
firm (gvkey) level.  
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Institutional 
Ownership (%)
Active Institutional 
Ownership (%)
Passive Institutional 
Ownership (%)
Number of 
Institutional Owners
Number of Active 
Institutional Owners
Number of Passive 
Institutional Owners
IR Dummy x Post IR -0.009 -0.015* 0.007 11.779** -0.886 13.241**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (5.369) (1.842) (5.298)
IR Dummy 0.010** -0.008** 0.020*** -2.815 -0.717 -0.421
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (2.437) (1.352) (2.426)
Post IR -0.006 -0.009 0.004 7.369 -0.918 10.375**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (4.857) (1.848) (4.975)
Log (MV) 0.007** -0.013*** -0.000 123.077*** 13.537*** 104.522***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (3.193) (0.583) (3.081)
Constant 0.705*** 0.491*** 0.495*** -693.021*** -62.023*** -619.368***
(0.093) (0.068) (0.065) (32.963) (7.814) (28.409)
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 11711 9282 9282 11711 10072 10072
adj. R2 0.219 0.174 0.142 0.782 0.156 0.715
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Table XIII Media Coverage/Tone and the Use of External IR Consultants 
The table uses OLS regressions on matched sample. The dependent variable is news coverage as Log (1 + 
# of News Articles). The main independent variables of interest include IR_Dummy and the Interaction 
between IR_Dummy and Negative Tone. Negative Tone is calculated as (the number of Negative Words – 
the number of Positive Words) / Total Number of Words. Negative words are from the word list provided 
by Loughran and McDonald (2011). In Model 1 and Model 2, the sample include all press releases. In 
Model 3 and Model 4, the sample only include non-repeated press releases. Standard errors in 
parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010). All regressions are clustered at firm (gvkey) level.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IR_Dummy 0.227*** 0.581*** 0.213*** 0.650**
(0.035) (0.223) (0.054) (0.298)
Negative Tone -0.485 -0.417
(0.346) (0.459)
IR_Dummy x Negative Tone -0.769* -0.936
(0.462) (0.611)
Market Cap 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-Book -0.001*** -0.005 -0.009** -0.009**
(0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Sales Growth -0.046*** -0.036 -0.040 -0.041
(0.015) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034)
ROA -0.209*** -0.205** -0.190** -0.208**
(0.074) (0.092) (0.089) (0.092)
Leverage 0.108 0.012 0.142* 0.141*
(0.071) (0.108) (0.075) (0.074)
Dividend Yield 0.136 0.340 0.191 0.227
(0.252) (0.406) (0.429) (0.426)
R&D -0.163 0.214 0.347 0.332
(0.155) (0.244) (0.241) (0.245)
Institutional Ownership 0.046 0.213** 0.160 0.188
(0.096) (0.102) (0.122) (0.123)
Liquidity -0.437*** -0.419*** -0.411*** -0.419***
(0.086) (0.102) (0.117) (0.113)
No. of Analyst Following 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.050***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Stock Volatility -0.133 0.184 0.161 0.185
(0.088) (0.117) (0.124) (0.127)
Stock Return -0.002 0.013 0.067** 0.072**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.032) (0.032)
Constant 4.052*** 3.720*** 3.738*** 3.877***
(0.216) (0.348) (0.398) (0.460)
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Clustering Y Y Y Y
N 4527 1114 844 844
adj. R-sq 0.575 0.557 0.534 0.541
DV: News Coverage
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Table XIV Media Coverage/Tone Pre- vs. Post-hiring External IR Consultants 
The table uses OLS regressions on matched sample. The dependent variable for Model 1 is news coverage 
as Log (1 + # of News Articles). The dependent variable for Model 2 is Negative Tone as (the number of 
Negative Words – the number of Positive Words) / Total Number of Words. Negative words are from the 
word list provided by Loughran and McDonald (2011). Both models include repeated press releases. 
Standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010). All regressions are clustered at firm 
(gvkey) level.  
 
 
(1) (2)
News Coverage Negative Tone
IR_Dummy -0.081 0.006**
(0.076) (0.003)
Post-Hiring IR -0.244*** 0.003
(0.080) (0.003)
IR_Dummy x Post-Hiring IR 0.236*** -0.007*
(0.089) (0.004)
Market Cap 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-Book -0.011 0.000
(0.019) (0.000)
Sales Growth -0.042 0.001
(0.058) (0.002)
ROA -0.660** 0.003
(0.257) (0.006)
Leverage 0.347*** -0.001
(0.119) (0.002)
Dividend Yield 0.392 0.019**
(0.286) (0.008)
R&D 1.514*** -0.011
(0.555) (0.013)
Institutional Ownership -0.390*** -0.003
(0.146) (0.004)
Liquidity -7.699*** 0.009
(1.178) (0.018)
Constant 5.396*** 0.485***
(0.251) (0.005)
Fixed Effects Y Y
Clustering Y Y
N 1595 1595
adj. R-sq 0.535 0.003
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Table XV Media Coverage around Activism Campaign Announcement Date 
The table uses OLS regressions on matched sample. The dependent variable is news coverage as Log (1 + 
# of News Articles). The main independent variables of interest is IR_Dummy. In Model 1, the sample 
includes all press releases one year pre- and post- activism campaign announcement dates. In Model 2, 
the sample includes all press releases six months pre- and post- activism campaign announcement dates. 
Standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010). All regressions are clustered at firm 
(gvkey) level.  
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
News Coverage News Coverage
One Year Pre and Post 
Announcement
Six Month Pre and 
Post Announcement
IR_Dummy 0.701** 0.695*
(0.279) (0.404)
Market Cap 0.269*** 0.197*
(0.085) (0.117)
Book-to-Market -0.326 -0.401
(0.281) (0.365)
Sales Growth -0.647 -0.789
(0.432) (0.497)
ROA 0.402 0.864
(1.134) (1.510)
Dividend Yield -2.226*** -1.469
(0.755) (1.239)
Institutional Ownership 0.472 0.824
(0.676) (1.032)
Liquidity -0.891** -0.970**
(0.351) (0.389)
Leverage -0.318 -0.842***
(0.297) (0.251)
R&D 1.595 6.356**
(2.187) (2.993)
Constant 1.098 1.381
(0.794) (1.091)
Clustering Y Y
N 340 178
adj. R-sq 0.087 0.100
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Table XVI Market Response (CAR) at the Announcement of Hiring IR 
Table shows the short-term mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) at the announcement of hiring IR 
for six different event windows. I compute the abnormal returns as the difference between the actual 
stock price return and the expected market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows 
indicated in the first column. Market model has been estimated using 100 days of daily returns ending 40 
days prior to the announcement date. I also report both the Patell Z-statistic and the corresponding p-
value. 
 
 
Windows Mean CAR Patell Z p-value
(0, 1) -0.66% -2.021 0.0433
(0, 2) -0.41% -1.000 0.3173
(-1, 1) -1.12% -2.703 0.0069
(-1, 2) -0.87% -1.778 0.0755
(-2, 2) -0.97% -1.863 0.0625
(-5, +5) -0.47% -0.668 0.5041
Announcement of Hiring IR
103 
 
Table XVII-a Value Impact of the use of External IR Consultants (short-term) 
Table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement of activism campaigns for six different event windows. 
Panel A presents results on activism campaigns led by prolific activists (with vs. without external IR). Panel B presents results on activism campaigns 
led by non-prolific activists (with vs. without external IR). The last column reports the p-value by comparing the CARs of two firm groups (with vs. 
without external IR) in both scenarios. I compute the abnormal returns as the difference between the actual stock price return and the expected 
market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows indicated in the first column. Market model has been estimated using 100 
days of daily returns ending 40 days prior to the announcement date. I also report both the Patell Z-statistic and the corresponding p-value. 
 
 
 
Differences
Windows Mean CAR Patell Z p-value Mean CAR Patell Z p-value p-value
(0, 1) 2.03% 28.523 <.0001 1.52% 6.745 <.0001 0.3751
(0, 2) 2.15% 24.939 <.0001 2.12% 6.142 <.0001 0.9573
(-1, 1) 2.48% 28.442 <.0001 2.25% 8.350 <.0001 0.7315
(-1, 2) 2.61% 26.060 <.0001 2.84% 7.781 <.0001 0.7383
(-2, 2) 2.85% 25.527 <.0001 2.90% 7.481 <.0001 0.9496
(-5, +5) 3.70% 22.355 <.0001 4.40% 7.249 <.0001 0.6127
Differences
Windows Mean CAR Patell Z p-value Mean CAR Patell Z p-value p-value
(0, 1) 3.16% 44.377 <.0001 0.93% 7.745 <.0001 0.0000
(0, 2) 3.59% 39.546 <.0001 1.21% 7.015 <.0001 0.0000
(-1, 1) 3.47% 38.216 <.0001 1.00% 7.622 <.0001 0.0000
(-1, 2) 3.90% 35.963 <.0001 1.28% 7.200 <.0001 0.0000
(-2, 2) 4.00% 33.186 <.0001 1.19% 6.669 <.0001 0.0000
(-5, +5) 5.36% 28.695 <.0001 1.19% 4.740 <.0001 0.0000
Firms without external IR Firms with external IR
Firms without external IR Firms with external IR
Panel A: Activism by Prolific Activists 
Panel B: Activism by Non-Prolific Activists 
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Table XVII-b Value Impact of the use of External IR Consultants (long-term) 
Table shows the long-term mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) after the activism campaigns for six different event windows. Panel A 
presents results on activism campaigns led by prolific activists (with vs. without external IR). Panel B presents results on activism campaigns led by 
non-prolific activists (with vs. without external IR). The last column reports the p-value by comparing the CARs of two firm groups (with vs. without 
external IR) in both scenarios. I compute the abnormal returns as the difference between the actual stock price return and the expected market 
model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows indicated in the first column. Market model has been estimated using monthly 
returns ending three months prior to the announcement date. I also report both the Patell Z-statistic and the corresponding p-value. 
 
 
Windows Differences
(month) Mean CAR Patell Z p-value Mean CAR Patell Z p-value p-value
(-1, -1) 1.81% 3.963 <0.0001 0.29% 0.692 0.489 0.3320
(-1, 0) 6.72% 12.213 <0.0001 3.70% 2.277 0.023 0.1678
(-1, 1) 6.66% 11.605 <0.0001 4.44% 1.961 0.050 0.1994
(-1, 6) 6.43% 9.637 <0.0001 4.63% 2.113 0.035 0.3993
(-1, 12) 6.24% 9.671 <0.0001 8.59% 2.346 0.019 0.8869
(-1, 18) 3.91% 9.842 <0.0001 13.31% 3.503 0.001 0.0248
Windows Differences
(month) Mean CAR Patell Z p-value Mean CAR Patell Z p-value p-value
(-1, -1) 0.39% -1.315 0.1885 -1.14% -0.689 0.491 0.1835
(-1, 0) 4.90% 7.257 <0.0001 0.82% 1.913 0.056 0.0122
(-1, 1) 5.13% 5.754 <0.0001 2.30% 2.884 0.004 0.0000
(-1, 6) 6.31% 4.165 <0.0001 2.78% 3.295 0.001 0.0000
(-1, 12) 4.95% 4.295 <0.0001 -1.57% 2.137 0.033 0.0000
(-1, 18) -0.22% 2.984 0.0028 -11.95% 1.886 0.059 0.0000
Panel A: Activism by Prolific Activists 
Firms without external IR Firms with external IR
Panel B: Activism by Non-Prolific Activists 
Firms without external IR Firms with external IR
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Table XVIII Market Response (CAR) at the Announcement of Management Winning Activism Campaign 
Table shows the short-term mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) at the announcement of management winning activism campaign for six 
different event windows. Panel A presents results on firms without external IR. Panel B presents results on firms with external IR. The last column 
reports the p-value by comparing the CARs of two firm groups (with vs. without external IR). I compute the abnormal returns as the difference 
between the actual stock price return and the expected market model (CRSP Value Weighted Index) return over the windows indicated in the first 
column. Market model has been estimated using 100 days of daily returns ending 40 days prior to the announcement date. I also report both the 
Patell Z-statistic and the corresponding p-value. 
 
 
 
  
Differences
Windows Mean CAR Patell Z p-value Mean CAR Patell Z p-value p-value
(0, 1) 0.67% 5.921 <.0001 -1.20% -4.458 <.0001 0.0086
(0, 2) 0.46% 3.232 0.0012 -1.16% -4.039 <.0001 0.0167
(-1, 1) 0.98% 6.283 <.0001 -0.78% -3.185 0.0015 0.0221
(-1, 2) 0.77% 4.056 <.0001 -0.74% -3.099 0.0019 0.0355
(-2, 2) 0.88% 4.314 <.0001 -0.78% -2.976 0.0029 0.0406
(-5, +5) 1.28% 3.780 0.0002 -0.18% -0.590 0.5553 0.4379
Announcement of Management Win
Panel A: Firms without external IR Panel B: Firms with external IR
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Table XIX: Controlling for the Support of Proxy Advisors 
The results in this table use ordered logit model where the dependent variable is management win, settlement, or activist win. The main 
independent variable is whether the targeted firm has hired an external IR consultant or not. I further categorize all the dissidents each year into 
the most prolific activists and less prolific based on the number of campaigns they initiated in the prior year. I include the top fifty such activists in 
the most prolific list and the rest as non-prolific activists. Panel A are the results from all campaigns, and Panel B are the results from campaigns 
run by the less prolific activists. Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
Support of Glass Lewis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation
IR_Dummy 0.449 0.525 0.325 0.906** 0.976** 0.875** -0.083 -0.600 -0.083
(0.320) (0.343) (0.316) (0.362) (0.383) (0.405) (0.505) (0.873) (0.505)
lag_Log (MV) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.136 -0.203 -0.399 0.061 -0.111 -0.309 -0.065 -0.151 -0.065
(0.442) (0.490) (0.460) (0.514) (0.578) (0.560) (0.913) (1.050) (0.913)
lag_Leverage 0.680** 0.791** 0.562* 0.546 0.691 0.544 0.255 0.324 0.255
(0.302) (0.379) (0.329) (0.360) (0.445) (0.396) (0.777) (1.198) (0.777)
lag_M/B -0.147** -0.134 -0.118 -0.137 -0.198 -0.036 -0.053 0.342 -0.053
(0.073) (0.124) (0.080) (0.141) (0.140) (0.151) (0.184) (0.354) (0.184)
lag_Dividend Yield 0.446 0.453 0.357 0.351 0.377 0.305 28.252* 22.399 28.252*
(0.335) (0.339) (0.295) (0.282) (0.294) (0.277) (16.440) (25.214) (16.440)
Glass Lewis Support 0.657 -0.917 0.783 1.442* 11.144*** 1.490* 0.722 0.306 0.722
(0.556) (1.223) (0.558) (0.824) (1.129) (0.840) (0.897) (1.513) (0.897)
cut1
Constant -2.183** -1.792 -2.366** -1.884** -1.196*** -2.016** -2.253 -1.318 -2.253
(1.060) (1.183) (1.089) (0.867) (0.375) (0.960) (2.104) (2.283) (2.104)
cut2
Constant -0.517 -0.188 -0.628 -0.330 0.342 -0.396 -0.015 0.943 -0.015
(1.061) (1.185) (1.088) (0.890) (0.394) (0.982) (2.074) (2.312) (2.074)
N 350 252 290 254 199 194 96 53 96
pseudo R-sq 0.068 0.102 0.049 0.102 0.147 0.079 0.070 0.082 0.070
Panel A: All Activists Panel B: Non-Prolific Activists Panel C: Prolific Activists
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Support of ISS 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation
IR_Dummy 0.466 0.498 0.350 0.897** 0.995*** 0.863** -0.287 -0.600 -0.287
(0.315) (0.336) (0.307) (0.358) (0.382) (0.402) (0.433) (0.873) (0.433)
lag_Log (MV) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.075 -0.220 -0.327 0.106 -0.101 -0.252 0.114 -0.151 0.114
(0.439) (0.489) (0.456) (0.513) (0.577) (0.559) (0.913) (1.050) (0.913)
lag_Leverage 0.666** 0.784** 0.540* 0.547 0.693 0.540 0.019 0.324 0.019
(0.298) (0.378) (0.323) (0.354) (0.447) (0.389) (0.751) (1.198) (0.751)
lag_M/B -0.144** -0.135 -0.113 -0.129 -0.201 -0.027 0.004 0.342 0.004
(0.072) (0.125) (0.078) (0.139) (0.140) (0.146) (0.178) (0.354) (0.178)
lag_Dividend Yield 0.459 0.449 0.368 0.349 0.369 0.306 22.892 22.399 22.892
(0.334) (0.341) (0.293) (0.284) (0.295) (0.279) (15.121) (25.214) (15.121)
ISS Support 1.008* -0.496 1.091* 0.894 -0.062 0.917 1.924* 0.306 1.924*
(0.570) (0.783) (0.575) (0.656) (0.816) (0.675) (1.056) (1.513) (1.056)
cut1
Constant -2.149** -1.802 -2.323** -1.833** -1.196*** -1.952** -2.118 -1.318 -2.118
(1.057) (1.184) (1.085) (0.862) (0.376) (0.953) (2.059) (2.283) (2.059)
cut2
Constant -0.473 -0.199 -0.574 -0.291 0.342 -0.348 0.195 0.943 0.195
(1.058) (1.186) (1.084) (0.887) (0.395) (0.977) (2.021) (2.312) (2.021)
N 350 252 290 254 199 194 96 53 96
pseudo R-sq 0.072 0.101 0.053 0.097 0.146 0.072 0.097 0.082 0.097
Panel A: All Activists Panel B: Non-Prolific Activists Panel C: Prolific Activists
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Support of Glass Lewis or ISS 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation
IR_Dummy 0.468 0.498 0.351 0.911** 0.995*** 0.883** 0.003 -0.600 0.003
(0.315) (0.336) (0.311) (0.360) (0.382) (0.404) (0.493) (0.873) (0.493)
lag_Log (MV) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.112 -0.220 -0.367 0.097 -0.101 -0.265 -0.023 -0.151 -0.023
(0.440) (0.489) (0.457) (0.513) (0.577) (0.559) (0.890) (1.050) (0.890)
lag_Leverage 0.674** 0.784** 0.551* 0.547 0.693 0.539 0.263 0.324 0.263
(0.300) (0.378) (0.325) (0.355) (0.447) (0.390) (0.768) (1.198) (0.768)
lag_M/B -0.145** -0.135 -0.115 -0.126 -0.201 -0.021 -0.055 0.342 -0.055
(0.073) (0.125) (0.079) (0.140) (0.140) (0.149) (0.182) (0.354) (0.182)
lag_Dividend Yield 0.446 0.449 0.360 0.359 0.369 0.316 29.032* 22.399 29.032*
(0.336) (0.341) (0.295) (0.283) (0.295) (0.279) (16.872) (25.214) (16.872)
Glass Lewis or ISS Support 0.425 -0.496 0.542 1.023* -0.062 1.083* 0.449 0.306 0.449
(0.497) (0.783) (0.500) (0.620) (0.816) (0.632) (0.869) (1.513) (0.869)
cut1
Constant -2.161** -1.802 -2.338** -1.837** -1.196*** -1.958** -2.216 -1.318 -2.216
(1.056) (1.184) (1.084) (0.865) (0.376) (0.958) (2.097) (2.283) (2.097)
cut2
Constant -0.501 -0.199 -0.606 -0.291 0.342 -0.347 0.010 0.943 0.010
(1.058) (1.186) (1.083) (0.889) (0.395) (0.983) (2.070) (2.312) (2.070)
N 350 252 290 254 199 194 96 53 96
pseudo R-sq 0.066 0.101 0.046 0.098 0.146 0.075 0.066 0.082 0.066
Panel A: All Activists Panel B: Non-Prolific Activists Panel C: Prolific Activists
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Table XX: Controlling for whether Activist has IR 
The results in this table use ordered logit model where the dependent variable is management win, settlement, or activist win. The main 
independent variable is whether the targeted firm has hired an external IR consultant or not. I further categorize all the dissidents each year into 
the most prolific activists and less prolific based on the number of campaigns they initiated in the prior year. I include the top fifty such activists in 
the most prolific list and the rest as non-prolific activists. Panel A are the results from all campaigns, and Panel B are the results from campaigns 
run by the less prolific activists. Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation All
Excluding Proxy 
Fight
Excluding Exempt 
Solicitation
IR_Dummy 0.495 0.485 0.392 0.845** 0.971** 0.842** 0.099 -0.735 0.099
(0.310) (0.342) (0.306) (0.360) (0.388) (0.402) (0.517) (0.757) (0.517)
lag_Log (MV) 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.108 -0.221 -0.345 0.063 -0.120 -0.355 -0.374 -1.816 -0.374
(0.440) (0.496) (0.455) (0.514) (0.575) (0.574) (0.850) (1.575) (0.850)
lag_Leverage 0.677** 0.779** 0.534* 0.518 0.687 0.521 0.319 0.956 0.319
(0.303) (0.383) (0.323) (0.348) (0.441) (0.390) (0.756) (1.528) (0.756)
lag_M/B -0.145** -0.131 -0.111 -0.124 -0.186 0.009 -0.065 0.432 -0.065
(0.073) (0.125) (0.078) (0.137) (0.141) (0.127) (0.178) (0.479) (0.178)
lag_Dividend Yield 0.428 0.460 0.351 0.313 0.381 0.285 30.391* 26.373 30.391*
(0.335) (0.342) (0.297) (0.283) (0.293) (0.278) (16.980) (28.986) (16.980)
Activist with IR -0.115 -0.005 0.238 0.434 0.591 1.906 -1.827 -4.401** -1.827
(0.511) (0.589) (0.707) (0.777) (0.798) (1.371) (1.169) (1.738) (1.169)
cut1
Constant -2.155** -1.793 -2.310** -1.850** -1.181*** -1.965** -2.484 -2.173 -2.484
(1.055) (1.184) (1.080) (0.871) (0.373) (0.972) (2.179) (2.339) (2.179)
cut2
Constant -0.500 -0.191 -0.588 -0.320 0.364 -0.364 -0.209 0.353 -0.209
(1.057) (1.187) (1.080) (0.894) (0.396) (0.996) (2.146) (2.322) (2.146)
N 350 252 290 254 199 194 96 53 96
pseudo R-sq 0.065 0.101 0.043 0.092 0.148 0.075 0.077 0.151 0.077
Panel A: All Activists Panel B: Non-Prolific Activists Panel C: Prolific Activists
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Table XXI: Controlling for Stock Return and Stock Volatility 
This table reports the results using logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable is a 
campaigns dummy (i.e., 1 = targeted in an activism campaign and 0 = not targeted in an activism campaign) 
and the main independent variable is whether the incumbent management has hired an external IR firm 
or not. All the models have industry and year fixed effects and have been clustered at the firm level. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy (Targeted 
within sample period 
After IR is Hired)
Dummy (Targeted 
within 3 years After IR 
is Hired)
Dummy (Targeted 
within 2 year After IR 
is Hired)
Dummy (Targeted 
within 1 year After IR 
is Hired)
IR_Dummy -0.159** -0.145** -0.113* -0.109
(-2.49) (-2.21) (-1.69) (-1.56)
lag_Size -0.050* -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.078***
(-1.81) (-3.04) (-3.02) (-2.64)
lag_M/B -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.026***
(-2.86) (-2.79) (-2.58) (-2.96)
lag_Sales Growth -0.058* -0.099** -0.097* -0.142**
(-1.68) (-2.07) (-1.85) (-2.31)
lag_ROA -0.103 -0.141 -0.189 -0.277
(-0.62) (-0.81) (-1.08) (-1.38)
lag_Leverage 0.135** 0.138** 0.127** 0.106**
(2.31) (2.29) (2.25) (2.10)
lag_Dividend Yield -0.702 -1.541 -2.581** -1.825
(-1.16) (-1.56) (-1.97) (-1.59)
lag_R&D/TA -0.208 -0.324 -0.466 -0.546
(-0.61) (-0.90) (-1.24) (-1.31)
lag_Institutional Ownership 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002
(0.43) (0.36) (0.25) (0.22)
lag_No. of Analyst 0.169*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.168***
(4.13) (3.68) (3.52) (3.83)
lag_liquidity 0.043 0.078 0.051 0.091
(0.37) (0.67) (0.35) (0.58)
Stock Return -0.153*** -0.204*** -0.214*** -0.217***
(-3.87) (-4.66) (-4.49) (-4.12)
Stock Volatility 0.426*** 0.357** 0.375** 0.431***
(3.06) (2.43) (2.40) (2.59)
Constant 0.771 0.114 -0.076 -0.417
(1.15) (0.13) (-0.09) (-0.48)
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
N 5366 4819 4605 4371
pseudo R-sq 0.107 0.107 0.103 0.106
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Table XXII: Variation in Outcome Results based on Different Types of Activists’ Demands 
The results in this table use logit model where the dependent variable is management win or activist win 
(excluding cases that are settled between management and activist). The main independent variable is 
whether the targeted firm has hired an external IR consultant or not. Model (1) covers activisms with all 
different types of demands. Model (2) and (3) look at activisms with general demand as “maximize 
shareholder value” or “more specific demands”. Standard errors are reported in parentheses (* p<0.10, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.010).  
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
All Demand: Maximize Shareholder Value
Demand: Other More 
Specific
IR_Dummy 1.055* 5.579** 0.887
(0.591) (2.725) (0.689)
lag_Log (MV) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag_Institutional Ownership -0.468 -2.515 -0.013
(0.666) (2.647) (0.826)
lag_Leverage 1.389** 9.575* 0.871
(0.595) (5.134) (0.691)
lag_M/B -0.086 -3.819 -0.141
(0.132) (2.634) (0.149)
lag_Dividend Yield 0.132 -0.490 7.671
(0.314) (0.671) (10.602)
Constant 1.306 4.710 0.569
(1.259) (3.273) (1.189)
N 241 30 194
pseudo R-sq 0.137 0.573 0.129
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Figure 1 Anatomy of Activism Campaigns 
The figure demonstrates how shareholder activists challenge the status quo of a target firm in different ways and stages. The first sign of potential 
activism campaign is 13D filing, which is required for shareholders with more than 5% of a company's shares. Activism campaigns can be broadly 
classified into two categories, namely, private negotiations and public negotiations. And public negotiations can be further categorized into Exempt 
Solicitation, Stockholder Campaign, and Proxy Fight.  
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Figure 2 Trends in Activism Campaigns and Average Amount Spent on Hiring Top-Tier IR Consultants 
The figure depicts two trends over my sample period from 2003 to 2014. The grey line shows the 
increasing trend of the average dollar amount spent per year by a publicly listed client for hiring a top-tier 
IR firm. The orange line shows the rising trend in shareholder activism during the sample period.  
 
 
